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JURISPRUDENCE VS. JUDICIAL PRACTICE: DIMINISHING
MILLER IN THE STRUGGLE OVER JUVENILE SENTENCING
ABSTRACT
Using a case from the Kansas Supreme Court, State v. Brown, as an
illustrative case, this Comment discusses the incremental dilution of the
Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama and explores the constitu-
tional consequences of this dilution. Juvenile sentencing jurisprudence
reflects a long-standing tradition of treating juveniles differently than
adults, the rationale for which is based on principles of reduced juvenile
culpability. While previous courts imposed categorical bans on particular
sentences as applied to juveniles, Miller v. Alabama combined two lines
of precedent to strike down mandatory life without parole, affecting the
process by which courts may sentence young offenders. Using the exist-
ing Eighth Amendment principle of diminished juvenile culpability and
infusing the analysis with death penalty jurisprudence, the Miller Court
required individualized consideration of a juvenile offender's mitigating
circumstances before imposition of life without parole. Though Miller's
narrow holding is limited to mandatory life without parole, the broader
Miller rationale is applicable to all juvenile sentencing proceedings. Ju-
veniles are categorically less mature, less able to assess risk, and more
capable of reform than adults, warranting individualized consideration of
the mitigating circumstances of youthfulness prior to sentencing. How-
ever, subsequent courts have incrementally diminished Miller's prospec-
tive strength using transfer decisions and declining to extend Miller's
narrow holding to its rational end. State v. Brown illustrates this incre-
mental attack. Affirming the transfer of thirteen-year-old Brown to adult
court and upholding Brown's hard twenty life sentence for felony mur-
der, the Brown court diluted Miller. Representative of post-Miller court
decisions, Brown exemplifies the ways in which subsequent courts limit
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INTRODUCTION
Juveniles are different than adults. They are less capable of as-
sessing risk and consequence, more irrational, more malleable, and there-
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fore less culpable.' Our nation's justice system recognizes this dimin-
ished responsibility and reflects a well-established practice of treating
juveniles differently.2 Based on categorical differences between youth
and adults, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment,"3 invokes a separate and lower threshold with regard to the
treatment of juvenile offenders and proportionality in juvenile sentencing
practice.4 But how low should the threshold go?
Despite conflicting legislation at the state level,5 modem juvenile
sentencing jurisprudence has not waivered when answering this question;
juveniles, being less culpable than adults, must be sentenced differently.6
While legal treatment of juvenile offenders has evolved to reflect in-
creased scientific insight into the development and maturation of the
human brain,7 these advances only confirm the lessened culpability of
youthful offenders and encourage a system that mitigates, rather than
punishes, the criminal behavior of youth.8 Based on this rationale-that
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012) ("We reasoned that those findings-
of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences-both lessened a
child's 'moral culpability' and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological de-
velopment occurs, his 'deficiencies will be reformed."' (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68-69 (2010))); see also Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too
Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 118-21 (2013); Nick Straley, Miller s Promise:
Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 970-76 (2014).
2. Elizabeth S. Scott, "Children Are Different ": Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 72 (2013) ("The Eighth Amendment opinions offer two consistent messag-
es-that juveniles who commit offenses are less culpable than their adult counterparts and that they
are more likely to reform."); see also Straley, supra note 1, at 965 ("[P]hysiological differences
between teenagers and adults carry constitutional significance and require that children be sentenced
differently-a principle firmly rooted in recent science and longstanding legal distinctions between
children and adults."); Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juve-
niles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1469 (2012) ("The United States
has long recognized that the differences between juveniles and adults require separate processing
and treatment for juvenile offenders.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
4. Scott, supra note 2, at 72 ("These conclusions are based on a proportionality analysis that
draws on behavioral and neurobiological research to delineate the attributes of adolescence that
distinguish teenage offending from adult criminal activity: these traits include adolescents' propensi-
ty for taking risks without considering future consequences; their vulnerability to external influ-
ences, particularly of peers; and their unformed characters.").
5. Id. at 92-94 ("The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public safety concerns
and the goal of punishing young criminals.").
6. Sean Craig, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road
Towards A Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 386-91 (2013) ("Since the Court decided
Thompson twenty-five years ago, its notions of what it means to be a juvenile have expanded, but the
fundamental message has gone unchanged. Juveniles, by definition, are not adults, and the reality of
their lives and growth make it unfair to treat them exactly as if they were."); see also Straley, supra
note 1, at 966 ("In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles differ
from adults in their psychosocial and neurological makeups and therefore must be sentenced differ-
ently-even when those children have committed heinous crimes.").
7. Scott, supra note 2, at 81-82.
8. Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 106 (2013); see also Straley, supra
note 1, at 965-69, 976 ("The Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller relied upon a wealth of relatively
recent neurological and psychosocial research in finding that children must be sentenced differently
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youthfulness translates into lesser culpability-the United States Su-
preme Court has championed the creation of tangible differences be-
tween juveniles and adults in our legal system.9 Accordingly, juvenile
sentencing jurisprudence has led to a shrinking pallet of sentencing op-
tions from which courts may choose in punishing young offenders.10
As part of this long-standing tradition, Miller v. Alabama" widened
the margin between juveniles and adults with regard to sentencing
schemes by invalidating mandatory life without parole as applied to ju-
veniles.12 The Miller holding, however, did more than pick up where the
previous jurisprudence left off. Rather than imposing a flat prohibition
on a particular sentence as applied to juveniles, the Court announced a
new way in which juveniles must be considered in the process of impos-
ing a sentence.'3 In fact, Miller combined and simultaneously extended
two lines of precedent:14 on one hand, Miller relied on existing rationale
that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults; on the other
hand, the Court used adult death penalty jurisprudence as a comparative
springboard to mandate individualized consideration of youthfulness
when imposing the harshest sentences, such as life without the possibility
of parole.'5
While Miller's narrow holding only invalidated mandatory life
without parole as applied to juveniles, the Court's broader rationale is
applicable in most juvenile sentencing hearings.'6 If juveniles are cate-
than adults. . . . And finally, barring a child from ever living outside a prison's walls 'forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.' It reflects 'an irrevocable judgment about [an offender's] value
and place in society, at odds with a child's capacity for change."' (second alteration in original)
(quoting Miller, 132 S Ct. at 2465)).
9. Scott, supra note 2, at 72-73 ("The Court has created a special status for juveniles through
doctrinal moves that had little precedent in its earlier Eighth Amendment cases. In its willingness to
find severe adult sentences to be excessive for juveniles, the Court elevated the prominence of pro-
portionality, setting aside the deference to legislatures that is a strong theme in modem Eighth
Amendment law and molding constitutional doctrine in a new direction.").
10. See Andrew Tunnard, Note, Not-So-Sweet Sixteen: When Minor Convictions Have Major
Consequences Under Career Offender Guidelines, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (2013).
11. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
12. See Scott, supra note 2, at 76.
13. Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1254 (2014).
14. Id. at 1254 n.22 ("Although the Court in Miller relied on two strains of precedent,...
neither dictated the outcome: The first line of precedent-adopting categorical bans on sentencing
practices that were excessively severe for a certain class of offenders-had never before been ex-
tended to include juveniles convicted of murder. The second line of precedent-requiring individual-
ized sentencing in the capital context-had never before been applied beyond the imposition of the
death penalty.").
15. Scott, supra note 2, at 75-76 (discussing the holding that "harsh sentence[s] could only be
imposed on a juvenile after the youth had the opportunity to produce evidence of mitigation," be-
cause of the "constitutional principle announced in Miller-'children are different."' (quoting Mil-
ler, 132 S Ct. at 2470)).
16. Alex Dutton, Comment, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing
Miller's Individualized Sentencing Requirement Beyond the JL WOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 173, 197 (2013) ("The notion that juveniles are developmentally different from adults
has no limit. . . . [T]he Court has relied on this doctrine to require that youth be treated differently
than adults by the justice system. The doctrine applied with equal weight to the juvenile death penal-
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gorically less culpable than adults, sentencing structures must reflect this
principle; an offender's youthful status should be used to mitigate on
behalf of the juvenile sentence.
Despite Miller's broad applicability, courts have found numerous
ways to limit the application of Miller's rationale. In any given case,
state and circuit courts will make multiple, incremental decisions that
appear reasonable in-and-of-themselves, but which produce unreasona-
ble, even absurd results in light of Miller's broad rationale. The effect of
this incremental decision making is a slow dilution of Miller's profound
contribution to juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. And the practical out-
come of diminishing Miller is that post-Miller courts will continue to
make juvenile sentencing indistinguishable from that of adults.'8
The tendency of courts to limit Miller's broad rationale is illustrat-
ed, in part, by State v. Brown,'9 a recent Kansas Supreme Court case that
ultimately declined to extend Miller's narrow holding.20 Using charging
decisions (which involve a determination of whether to charge a juvenile
as an adult) and a straight-line reading of Miller's comparison of juvenile
sentences to the harshest adult sentences, the Brown court held a hard
twenty life sentence-an indeterminate life sentence without the possibil-
ity of parole for twenty years-did not violate the Constitution when
imposed on a juvenile offender.21 The court reasoned that a hard twenty
life sentence was not the harshest punishment available for a juvenile
and, therefore, not within Miller's reach.22 Miller used a comparison be-
tween imposing life without parole on juveniles and imposing the death
penalty on adults as a springboard for requiring individualized sentenc-
ing before imposing life without parole on a juvenile. Ironically, the
Brown court employed this same comparison to justify its conclusion that
a hard twenty life sentence was not unduly harsh for a juvenile; this is,
however, in direct opposition to the broader Miller rationale.23
ty as it did to JLWOP and juvenile Miranda rights. The imposition of mandatory sentences on juve-
nile offenders must comply with these entrenched constitutional findings." (footnotes omitted)).
17. Scott, supra note 2, at 74 ("Implicit in this generalization is a broader principle that the
same attributes of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of the youths whose crimes the Court has
reviewed reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles' criminal choices generally.").
18. See loana Tehoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric
and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 101-02 (2013) (arguing that
through transfer laws and harsh, mandatory sentences "the current system treats [children] as if they
are as culpable as adults.. . .To bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, the Court needs to take
the reasoning in Miller to its logical conclusion."). But see Scott, supra note 2, at 95 (stating that
there "is a growing tendency among lawmakers and the public to accept (once again) that young
offenders are different from adults").
19. 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014).
20. Id at 797.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. See id ("The parallels between life-without-parole sentences and the death penalty that
made Woodson applicable in Miller are not present in this case. A hard 20 life sentence does not
irrevocably adjudge a juvenile offender unfit for society.").
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This Comment examines the ineffectiveness of Miller in light of a
national tendency to avoid or contain its rationale in juvenile sentencing.
Using the Kansas Supreme Court holding in State v. Brown as an illustra-
tive case, this Comment explores the ways in which courts have diluted
Miller's strength to the detriment of our constitutionally enshrined prin-
ciple that juveniles are different from adults. Part II of this Comment
explores the background of juvenile sentencing that contributed to the
evolution of modem juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Part III provides
an analysis of the Miller v. Alabama holding and explores the Court's
broader rationale, as applied to all juvenile sentencing. Part IV then re-
views the narrow holding in State v. Brown, installing the case as a
springboard for discussion of juvenile sentencing. Referencing State v.
Brown, Part V analyzes the ways in which the Miller rationale has been
incrementally diluted by transfer mechanisms and subsequent rulings,
which decline to extend Miller. Part VI then discusses the implications of
ignoring Miller, as it diminishes the constitutional line between juveniles
and adults. Ultimately, this Comment explores the ways in which subse-
quent court decisions undermine the Miller rationale and offend the long-
standing tradition of treating juveniles differently.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Juvenile Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment
Since 1899, when the first juvenile court was established in Illinois,
the United States has recognized juveniles as constitutionally different
from adults.24 Before then, "juvenile offenders generally were treated by
the law in the same manner as adults."25 Yet, with rising concerns re-
garding the imposition of adult punishments on juveniles, states invoked
a "parens patriae" role that allowed the state to be a "protector [of juve-
niles] rather than punisher."26 Under this rationale, "a separate court sys-
tem . . . replaced traditional notions of punishment with a 'clinical' ap-
proach emphasizing rehabilitation and treatment."27 That is, although
exclusion from criminal laws did not render juveniles exempt from all
consequences, juvenile proceedings were "civil in nature, rather than
criminal or adversarial."28 This system of separation, in "reject[ing] con-
24. See Sara E. Fiorillo, Note, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and Reme-
dies for the Future ofJuvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095, 2098-99 (2013).
25. Laoise King, Colorado Juvenile Court History: The First Hundred Years, 32 COLO. LAW.
63, 63 (2003).
26. Kristina H. Chung, Note, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in
Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1011 (1991) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
27. Id. at 1009.
28. Id. at 1010.
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cepts of criminal responsibility and punishment,"2 9 codified differences
between juveniles and adults with regard to culpability.30
1. Juveniles in the Law: Delinquency vs. Criminal Charges
This approach implicated modem day notions of charging and sen-
tencing where the axis of both concepts turned not on the crime, but ra-
ther on the juvenile.31 This is evidenced by the fact that juvenile cases, no
matter what offense a juvenile committed, were delinquency proceed-
ings-involving determination as to whether a minor required "supervi-
sion of the court"-as opposed to the criminal proceedings imposed on
adult offenders.32 Here, "the purpose of the juvenile court was to focus
on the offender" within the scope of delinquency.3 3 As a result, criminal
courts imposed punitive sentences based on the committed crime while
juvenile courts instituted corrective measures based on the juvenile's
needs.34 This became a powerful distinction, because it saved juveniles
from adult sentences by deliberately placing youth on a rehabilitative,
rather than retributive track.
Though forty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia, institut-
36
ed juvenile courts by 1925, this principle of separation enjoyed little
practical effect as a result of charging decisions and sentencing schemes,
which are inextricably linked. With regard to charging decisions, the law
began recognizing some juveniles were "unfit for such programs, [and]
thus . . . require[ed] adjudication in adult courts."37 As such, juvenile
courts were allowed to transfer juvenile offenders to face charges in
29. Wood, supra note 2, at 1468.
30. Alison Powers, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory Sentencing ofJuveniles
Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 241,
246-47 (2009) (exploring rationale for separate juvenile courts, as juveniles had "less than fully
developed moral and cognitive capacities" (quoting HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT, at 94 (2006),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
31. See Jennifer Taylor, Note, California s Proposition 21: A Case ofJuvenile Injustice, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 983, 986 (2002); see also Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine Thai Arrived at the Wrong
Station: How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 420 (1999)
("A hallmark of the juvenile court, however, has always been indeterminate sentencing, which al-
lows a judge to focus on the juvenile instead of the crime." (footnote omitted)).
32. Taylor, supra note 31, at 986.
33. Id. (quoting Sara Raymond, Comment, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Vio-
lence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 Does to California s Juvenile Justice System and
Reasons to Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 233, 239 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted).
34. Id.
35. See Zierdt, supra note 31, at 407 ("[I]t is evident that over the years the juvenile court
came to be seen as a benevolent institution, designed to help and rehabilitate children instead of to
simply punish them.").
36. Wood, supra note 2, at 1468.
37. Brice Hamack, Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect Due
Process: Why Waiving Juveniles into Adult Court Without a Fitness Hearing Is a Denial of Their
Basic Due Process Rights, 14 Wyo. L. REV. 775, 785 (2014).
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criminal court.38 Although this waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over the
young offender was to be used "only in exceptional cases,"39 the excep-
tion has become the ever-expanding rule as more juveniles are tried as
40adults in the widening net of state transfer mechanisms.
First, states expanded the options available for transferring a juve-
nile to adult criminal court, providing mechanisms for transfer by "either
judicial waiver, legislative waiver, mandatory judicial waiver, or prose-
cutorial waiver."41 This left juvenile offenders more exposed to prosecu-
tion as an adult.4 2 What is more, most states have "once an adult, always
an adult" provisions that "automatically exclude[] minors from juvenile
court adjudication once they have been tried and convicted in criminal
court."4 3 The most common waiver, a judicial waiver, often requires the
juvenile judge to consider particular factors with regard to the transfer
determination, though juvenile judges have considerable discretion in
deciding whether to transfer the juvenile." However, in the aftermath of
a violence scare during the 1980s and 90s, a new "'get tough' mentali-
ty ... spilled over into the juvenile court system,"45 resulting in even
more statutorily prescribed transfers to limit this discretion.46 It is clear
now that "[c]urrent state law favors mandatory transfers over discretion-
ary transfers of serious juvenile offenders to adult criminal court."47
38. Brian J. Fuller, Case Note, Criminal Law-A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing,
but Is It Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 Wyo. L. REV. 377, 379-81 (2013).
39. Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1996) (quoting Jeffrey S.
Schwartz, Note, The Youth Offender: Transfer to the Adult Court and Subsequent Sentencing, 6
CRIM. JUST. J. 281, 290 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults
in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 86-89 (2013); see also Slobogin,
supra note 8, at 103 ("Numerous states increased the types of crimes that trigger transfer and most
also lowered the age at which it could occur. . . .").
41. Hamack, supra note 37, at 778; see Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids Anymore: A
Need for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 391, 399
(2001) ("Between 1992 and 1997, forty-four states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation
expanding the transfer of jurisdiction over juveniles.").
42. See Zierdt, supra note 31, at 414-22 ("Today, however, we are moving away from the
rehabilitative ideal in juvenile court by making the juvenile court resemble an adult criminal court or
by certifying juveniles to stand trial in adult court.").
43. Andrea Knox, Note, Blakely and Blended Sentencing: A Constitutional Challenge to
Sentencing Child "Criminals," 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1274 (2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) ("Thirty-four states currently have 'once an adult, always an adult' provisions on their books.").
44. Zierdt, supra note 31, at 418.
45. Hamack, supra note 37, at 787-88.
46. Id. at 788; see also Slobogin, supra note 8, at 103 ("A third of the states also enacted
statutes authorizing prosecutorial waiver or 'direct file,' while the number of jurisdictions that
adopted 'automatic' transfer regimes for designated crimes (rather than leaving that decision to the
discretion of the juvenile court or the prosecutor) more than doubled to thirty-one."); Zierdt, supra
note 3 1, at 418 ("[B]ecause the public often views these judges as too lenient, a popular method of
increasing transfers is to limit the judge's discretion in the transfer decision.").
47. Cintron, supra note 39, at 1254; see also Slobogin, supra note 8, at 104 ("While in the
past several years some states have reduced the scope of transfer or have raised the age for criminal
court jurisdiction, the latter number has stayed fairly constant since 2000." (footnote omitted)).
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Second, while most statutes limit transfers "to juveniles of a mini-
mum age who have been charged with specific offenses,"48 states have
consistently lowered this minimum age at which a juvenile may be
charged as an adult, instituting a "trend of lowering rather than raising
the age of juvenile criminal liability." 4 9 For example, in the late 1990's,
Missouri lowered its minimum transfer age to twelve from fourteen; In-
diana lowered its minimum age to ten from sixteen; and twenty-two
states "no longer impose[d] any minimum age requirement for at least
one method of transferring jurisdiction to adult court."50 Many of these
legislative changes were proffered in the wake of a perceived increase in
violence, rising from the sensationalism of press, not from consideration
of long-enduring tenets of the juvenile court or from consideration of the
juveniles themselves.51 As states widened their nets with regard to trans-
fers, increasing numbers of juveniles became ensnared in the adult crim-
* 52inal system.
In effect, "[t]he liberalization of transfer laws . . . seems to reflect
this logic; the fact that someone is a juvenile is not itself a sufficient ba-
sis for granting the leniency afforded by the juvenile criminal justice
system."53 As a result, "many of the transfer statutes are keyed not to the
maturity level of the offender, but to the seriousness of the offense,"54
which not only offends the rehabilitative rationale underlying juvenile
courts, but results in harsher sentences without achieving the hoped-for
deterrence.
2. Juvenile Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment
With state transfer laws funneling more juveniles into adult court,
which changed the sentencing schemes applied to those juveniles,57 the
48. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 400.
49. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 867 & n.3 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
multiple state laws lowering the applicable waiver age).
50. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 399.
51. Zierdt, supra note 31, at 419.
52. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 104 ("In New York State alone, this move led to the adult
prosecution of over 45,000 youths aged sixteen and seventeen in 2010. . . . [A]nd the number of
juveniles under eighteen prosecuted as adults skyrocketed from somewhere between 10,000 and
15,000 a year to 250,000 a year." (footnotes omitted)).
53. Pimentel, supra note 40, at 89.
54. Id. at 91.
55. See id. at 86; see also Robert Anthonsen, Note, Furthering the Goal ofJuvenile Rehabili-
tation, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 729, 741 (2010) (discussing numerous studies that show "adult
criminal sentencing and the threat of adult criminal sentencing have proven ineffective in deterring
juvenile crime and recidivism"); Cynthia R. Noon, Comment, "Waiving" Goodbye to Juvenile
Defendants, Getting Smart vs. Getting Tough, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 453-54 (1994) (discussing
how legislative waivers are inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals ofjuvenile courts because "they
focus on the offense rather than the individual juvenile's characteristics").
56. See Wendy N. Hess, Kids Can Change: Reforming South Dakota's Juvenile Transfer Law
to Rehabilitate Children and Protect Public Safety, 59 S.D. L. REV. 312, 313 (2014) (stating there
are about "250,000 children under age eighteen who are sent to the U.S. adult criminal system every
year").
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Supreme Court began to consider whether applying certain harsh adult
sentences to juveniles was constitutional.58 Specifically, the Court in-
voked the same rationale used to establish juvenile courts, insisting that
youth were different from adults because "their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult" due to their lack of expe-
rience, education, and lesser intelligence,5 9 and that such differences car-
ried Eighth Amendment implications with regard to sentencing.60 As a
result of this rationale, the Court proffered a series of decisions, which
incrementally explored the question: to what extent is criminal sentenc-
ing required to treat juveniles differently?
The Court began chipping away at harsh juvenile sentencing in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,6 1 a case in which a fifteen-year-old was con-
victed of homicide and sentenced to death.62 Holding the death penalty
for a juvenile offender under the age of sixteen is unconstitutional, the
Court reasoned that "youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and to psychological damage."63 Accordingly, the Court weighed the
need for "punishment [to] be directly related to . . . personal culpabil-
ity,"16 and assessed the "differences which must be accommodated in
determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of
adults."65 The Court found the death penalty, as applied to a fifteen-year-
old, antithetical to the purpose of the penalty: "the lesser culpability of
the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's
fiduciary obligations to its children" made principles of retribution "in-
applicable" and notions of deterrence unfounded.6 6 Here, the Thompson
Court returned to the bedrock principles of juvenile courts, recognizing
that "the Court ha[d] already endorsed the proposition that less culpabil-
ity should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult."67
Following Thompson, the Court invoked this notion of reduced ju-
venile culpability to further limit juvenile sentencing options. In Roper v.
57. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 403 ("Naturally, if jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred
to adult court and the juvenile is found guilty of the offense, the court may impose upon the juvenile
the adult sanction appropriate for the offense.").
58. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824-35 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also id.
at 867-69, 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the trend in lowering the age at which juveniles
may be sentenced as adults, while considering whether the death sentence was unconstitutional as
applied to a fifteen year-old).
59. Id at 835 (plurality opinion).
60. Id at 833-35.
61. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 818-19.
63. Id. at 834, 838 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
64. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
65. Id. at 823 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
66. Id. at 836-37.
67. Id at 835.
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Simmons,68 a seventeen-year-old was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death.69 The Roper Court held the death penalty, as applied to all per-
sons under the age of eighteen, is unconstitutional.70 Here, the Roper
Court extended Thompson's rationale by elaborating on the chasmic dif-
ferences between juveniles and adults. First, the Court noted "[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . in youth
more often than in adults . . . . result[ing] in . . . ill-considered actions
and decisions. Second, the Court reiterated the fact that juveniles are
more "vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pres-
sures."72 Finally, the Court noted the malleability of juvenile character,
explaining that the "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory,
less fixed," and therefore more capable of reform.73 For these reasons,
the Court concluded, "juvenile offenders cannot . . . be classified among
the worst offenders," as to warrant the "most severe punishment."74
In 2010, the Court again leveraged notions of diminished juvenile
culpability to insulate youth from harsh sentences. In Graham v. Flori-
da,'75 the Court reviewed a seventeen-year-old juvenile's sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. The seventeen-year-old had been
charged with robbery, "possessing a firearm, and .. . associating with
persons engaged in criminal activity"-all violations of his 3-year proba-
tion for prior commissions.76 The Graham Court held that life without
the possibility of parole is unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles
for nonhomicidal offenses. In analyzing this "categorical challenge to a
term-of-years sentence"78 as applied to juvenile offenders, the Court con-
tinued the Thompson and Roper rationale that because juveniles possess
"lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punish-
ments."79
However, the Court applied this rationale with specific reference to
and concern for the severity of life without parole sentences as applied to
juveniles convicted of nonhomicidal crimes.80 Finding "[t]he age of the
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis,"8' the
Court reasoned that life without parole was particularly ill-applied to
68. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
69. Id at 556.
70. Id. at 578.
71. Id at 569 (first alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id at 570.
74. Id at 568-69.
75. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
76. Id. at 55, 57.
77. Id at 74-75.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id at 68.
80. Id. at 68-75.
81. Id. at 69.
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juveniles, when considering the "penological justifications for the sen-
tencing practice" in light of a juvenile's diminished culpability and the
nonhomicidal nature of the offense.82 Specifically, the Court noted: "Life
without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile," given
the percentage of life a juvenile would spend incarcerated.83 Because life
without parole was the harshest sentence a juvenile offender could re-
ceive at that time, the Court likened this sentence to the most severe pun-
ishment available for adults-the death penalty.8 Recognizing both sen-
tences facilitated the same grave result,85 and failed to satisfy penological
goals of the criminal system, the Court found "the limited culpability of
juvenile nonhomicide offenders" was "not adequate to justify life with-
out parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders."86 In continuation of this
rationale, the Court also concluded that while a state does not have to
assure the ultimate release of juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes,
it must provide those juveniles "some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."87
II. MILLER V. ALABAMA INTRODUCES INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial juvenile sentencing
decision came on the heels of Graham in 2012. In Miller v. Alabama, the
Supreme Court considered two cases on collateral review: two fourteen-
year-olds were "convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole."88 The Court held that mandatory life
without parole for juveniles was unconstitutional.89 In making this de-
termination, the Court relied on "the confluence of . .. two lines of prec-
edent" expressed in Roper and Graham.90 First, the Court reasoned, as it
did in Roper and Graham, that "the distinctive attributes of youth" make
children "constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentenc-
ing."9' The operation of this principle therefore "diminish[ed] the peno-
logical justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile of-
fenders."92 Second, the Court relied on Graham's reasoning-drawing a
parallel between life-without-parole sentences imposed on juveniles to
the death penalty imposed on adults-to extend the rationale for individ-
ualized consideration of a juvenile before imposing life-without-
parole."93 Thus, and in light of this precedent, the Court concluded indi-
82. Id. at 63, 71-73.
83. Id. at 70-71.
84. Id. at 69-70.
85. Id. at 69 ("[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences
that are shared by no other sentences.").
86. Id. at 71-75.
87. Id. at 75.
88. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
89. Id.
90. Id at 2464.
91. Id. at 2458, 2465.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2466.
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vidualized consideration of mitigating factors of youth is required when a
juvenile faces life without possibility of parole.94
In combining the Roper and Graham precedents, the Miller Court
concluded the difference between juveniles and adults is constitutionally
pertinent because youth (1) lack mental maturity and responsibility; (2)
are more susceptible to outside influences; and (3) are more capable of
change, such that they may be rehabilitated.95
The Court held that because "youth matters in determining the ap-
propriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of pa-
role,"96 a "judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider certain
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles."97 These mitigating circumstances, laid down by the Court,
included:
"[C]hronological age and its hallmark features-among them, imma-
turity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,"
his "family and home environment," "the circumstances of the homi-
cide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him," and
the prospects for rehabilitation while incarcerated.98
A. Miller's Broad Rationale for Individualized Consideration is Appli-
cable to All Juvenile Sentencing Proceedings
Miller's broader rationale, despite its narrow holding, sparked a tug-
of-war between the principles expressed in juvenile sentencing jurispru-
dence, and the actual, subsequent reatment of juvenile offenders in state
and federal courts.99 The Miller Court used a comparison between the
death penalty, imposed on adult criminals, and life-without-parole as
applied to juveniles to arrive at an individualization requirement.'00 This
was a legal springboard catapulting juvenile sentencing jurisprudence
forward into an individualization requirement. However, by making this
comparison, Miller allowed subsequent courts to afford juveniles indi-
vidualized protection only where a similarly situated adult criminal
would receive such. To say, as this Comment does, that Miller's broader
rationale is being incrementally diminished, is to imply that such diminu-
tion is not warranted. It is therefore necessary to establish this founda-
94. Id at 2467-68 ("Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach
that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as
an adult.").
95. Id. at 2464; see also Straley, supra note 1, at 968 (footnotes omitted).
96. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
97. Id. at 2475.
98. Id at 2468.
99. See Tehoukleva, supra note 18, at 102 ("The Court's admission that 'children are consti-
tutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing' does not match the experience of juve-
niles in the criminal justice system." (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464)).
100. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
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tional premise-that the broader Miller rationale, rather than the narrow
Miller holding, is an appropriately applicable standard in juvenile sen-
tencing schemes-before exposing the lack of its proper treatment in
subsequent judicial decisions.
1. Individualized Consideration at the Core of Sentencing Juvenile
Offenders
The rationale expressed in Miller, though a continuation of the ra-
tionale used in Thompson, Roper, and Graham, introduced a new princi-
ple for juvenile sentencing: individualized consideration of a juvenile
offender when imposing the harshest sentences.101 Where the Thompson
and Roper Courts focused on a particular sentence as applied to a catego-
ry of offenders (juveniles),10 2 and the Graham Court focused on a partic-
ular crime as disproportionate to a singular sentence with respect to that
category of offenders,103 the Miller Court broke new ground by focusing
on the individual mitigating circumstances of the particular juvenile of-
fender to prohibit mandatory imposition of life without parole.'1" While
each Court imposed a categorical ban on particular sentences with regard
to juvenile offenders, only the Miller Court combined this precedent with
its individualization requirement to strike down the mandatory applica-
tion of a particularly harsh sentence.0 5 The focus on the harshest sen-
tences is indicative of Miller's intent to shape juvenile sentencing juris-
prudence in a way that focuses on the individual and youthful status of a
juvenile offender, rather than the crime committed or sentence applied.06
Though the Miller Court only required individualized consideration
in cases where juveniles face life without parole,107 the rationale, which
justified and mandated the process of individualized sentencing, extends
to all sentences imposed on juvenile offenders for two primary reasons.
First, the Miller Court focused more on the individual circumstances of
the juvenile offender than on the sentence itself, promoting a resurrection
of juvenile-centered juvenile sentencing.0 8 Second, the Court's rationale
in requiring individualization can remain intact upon application to other
mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes.
101. Scott, supra note 2, at 88.
102. Michael Barbee, Comment, Juveniles Are Different: Juvenile Life Without Parole After
Graham v. Florida, 81 Miss. L.J. 299, 303-05, 307 (2011).
103. Id. at 310.
104. See Sonia Mardarewich, Certainty in a World of Uncertainty: Proposing Statutory Guide-
lines in Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without Parole, 16 SCHOLAR 123, 125 (2013) (implying the
revolutionary nature of Miller's holding).
105. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2014).
106. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 97 (arguing that "the Court in Miller opened the door to a
much more thorough challenge of the current system, namely the argument that all juveniles deserve
individualized justice").
107. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
108. See id. (discussing the rationale behind individualized sentencing for juveniles by saying
"mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances
most suggest it").
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i. Miller's Focus on the Individual Juvenile Offender
Turning to Miller's universally applicable rationale for individual-
ized consideration, the Court's general focus on an offender's juvenile
status is instructive in all juvenile sentencing proceedings. Rather than
categorically banning life without the possibility of parole for all juve-
niles, the Miller Court held that the juvenile status of an offender triggers
individualized consideration of that particular youth's mitigating circum-
stances in the imposition of such a sentence.109 In a lengthy discussion of
the offending juveniles, Miller and Jackson, the Court focused primarily
on the mitigating circumstances attending their crimes rather than focus-
ing on the crime.'10 Discussing Miller, the Court noted, "if ever a patho-
logical background might have contributed to a 14-year-old's commis-
sion of a crime, it is here."" While acknowledging that there is no doubt
he "committed a vicious murder," the Court quickly moved on to discuss
how "Miller's stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-
addicted mother neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a
result; and he had tried to kill himself four times."11 2
In reference to Jackson, the Court points out that "his age could well
have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willing-
ness to walk away" when he learned that his friend had a gun.l 13 Noting
that "[b]oth his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other
individuals," the Court pays special attention to the individual "circum-
stances [that went] to Jackson's culpability for the offense."1 4 Ultimate-
ly, the Court applies a great deal of weight to the individual circumstanc-
es of each offender in determining the sentence is too harsh.'15
In turning judicial attention away from the crime and corresponding
sentence towards the juvenile offender himself, the Court discusses the
need for individualized consideration, saying, "At the least, a sentencer
should look at such facts before depriving a 14-year-old of any prospect
of release from prison."' 6 Regardless of whether the Court was actually
exercising "judicial minimalism"ll 7 in making this determination instead
109. Id. at 2469 (saying "[b]ecause that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not
consider Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categor-
ical bar on life without parole for juveniles," while asserting its expectation that such sentences
would be "uncommon.").
110. Id. at 2468-69.
111. Id at 2469.
112. Id
113. Id. at 2468.
114. Id.
115. Id. (discussing how "[b]oth cases before [the Court] illustrate the problem" that arises
when "imposing a State's harshest penalties [because] a sentencer misses too much if he treats every
child as an adult").
116. Id. at 2469.
117. See Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama
Led the Court's "Kids Are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down A Blind Alley, 46
AKRON L. REv. 489, 491 (2013).
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of imposing a categorical ban, the door to this particular rationale was
nonetheless opened and left deliberately wide open.m
This is especially true where a categorical ban on life without parole
seems more minimalistic in effect than a lengthy combination of two
precedential lines that so curiously and obviously baits the extension of
individualization requirements in all juvenile sentencing. For example,
had the Court imposed a categorical ban on life without parole as applied
to juveniles, it could have simply extended Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society."'"19 While foreclosing all opportunity to im-
pose life without parole on juveniles, which is arguably more immediate-
ly effective,1 2 0 a categorical ban would have left untouched a nationwide
practice of treating juveniles like adults, aside from the small subset of
categorically forbidden sentences. It would not have infused the sentenc-
ing inquiry with an individualization requirement, and courts would not
be obliged to meaningfully consider youthfulness as a mitigating fac-
tor.121 As a result, the door to meaningful consideration of a juvenile of-
fender's youthfulness before the imposition of other sentences would
remain closed.22
However, because the Court chose to build on the jurisprudence re-
quiring individualized sentencing, lower courts should take note and
begin following suit-considering juveniles as juveniles.123 This opened
the door to forward thinking that could-and arguably does-require
individual consideration of juveniles before imposing any sentence.
118. See Piper Waldron, Case Comment, Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama's Implications for
Individualized Review in Juvenile Sentencing, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 775, 776 (2013) ("Miller ex-
pands the Eighth Amendment as it is applied to juveniles, since its reasoning may challenge other
mandatory laws that negate individualized sentencing.").
119. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120. Fuller, supra note 38, at 392-93 ("The Court, however, should have engaged fully in the
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis and adopted a categorical rule prohibiting life without
parole sentences for all juveniles. A categorical rule would still give sentencing judges ample discre-
tion to impose a severe punishment that fulfills the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation while properly focusing on the juvenile offender's rehabilitation and taking youth into
account as a mitigating factor." (footnotes omitted)).
121. Id. at 394 (noting that, while Miller did not provide proper guidance for subsequent
courts, "courts are now required to consider youth as a mitigating factor").
122. See id at 393 ("The State could best comply with Miller in one of two ways. First, the
state can require judges to consider mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. Second, the state
can simply eliminate life without parole for juveniles." (footnotes omitted)).
123. See id at 403-04 (discussing that, although, "the Court did not address whether a lengthy
term of years sentence for juvenile offenders would violate the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual," subsequent courts have interpreted Miller to implicate sentences other than mandatory life
without parole).
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ii. Miller's Rationale Applies to Other Mandatory Sentencing
Schemes
In addition to focusing on the individual circumstances of an of-
fender because of his or her juvenile status, the Court's assertion that
youthfulness is a justification for diminished juvenile culpability operates
as a universally mitigating factor in juvenile sentencing.124 This opens
the door to individualized sentencing of all juvenile offenders. While the
Court does state that rendering youth "irrelevant . . . poses too great a
risk of disproportionate punishment," when imposing only the "harshest
prison sentence,"1 25 the Court's rationale is applicable to all mandatory
sentencing schemes, as the mitigating factors of youth are inherently
present in all sentencing considerations with regard to juvenile offend-
ers.126 For example, the Court's discussion of the "flaws [in] imposing
mandatory life-without-parole" on juveniles reveals a transferrable justi-
fication with regard to the disproportionate effects of such sentences on
less culpable, youthful individuals.127 In saying that "[s]uch mandatory
penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an
offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances at-
tendant to it," 28 the Court identifies common reality inherent in all man-
datory sentences applied to juveniles. The Court further expresses dissat-
isfaction that
[u]nder these schemes, every juvenile [would] receive the same sen-
tence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shoot-
er and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the
child from a chaotic and abusive one. . . . [E]ach juvenile (including
these two 14-year-olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast
majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses .... 129
The rationale for mitigating all juvenile sentencing with considera-
tion of an individual offender also has an important degree of logical
transferability with regard to the Court's analysis of both punitive goals
and youthfulness. The punitive goals of criminal sentencing and the prin-
ciples of lessened culpability due to an offender's youthfulness are equal-
ly implicated in other mandatory sentencing schemes.130 The Court rec-
124. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
125. Id. at 2469.
126. Id. at 2467 (discussing the application of the mitigating qualities of youth throughout
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and recognizing that "we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer
have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth.' Everything we said in Roper and
Graham about that stage of life also appears in these [prior] decisions." (citation omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))); id at 2466 (discussing how the "mandatory penalty
schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations").
127. See id
128. Id
129. Id. at 2467-68.
130. See Waldron, supra note 118, at 786-90; see also Powers, supra note 30, at 254
("[M]andatory minimums clearly disserve the best interests of juveniles tried as adults in failing to
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ognized that where "'[t]he heart of the retribution rationale' relates to an
offender's blameworthiness," a mandatory imposition of life without
parole is scarcely useful in sentencing a less culpable offender.131 This
same rationale applies to all mandatory sentencing schemes because such
schemes not only preclude consideration of a juvenile's categorically
lessened culpability, but preclude individualized consideration of that
juvenile as well. 13 2 In addition, the punitive goal of deterrence is not like-
ly achieved by any mandatory sentencing scheme, where the Miller
Court itself asserted, "'the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults'-their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity-
make them less likely to consider potential punishment."33 This rationale
is applicable to any mandatory sentences, where any potential punish-
ment is likely to have little effect on juvenile actions.134
The second piece of Miller's rationale that applies to all mandatory
juvenile sentencing is the juvenile's youthful characteristics. The Miller
Court's rationale is transferable to other mandatory sentencing schemes
as the same characteristics of youth are inherent in all juveniles. For ex-
ample, the Miller Court leans heavily on the principles expressed in
Thompson, Roper, and Graham: "youth is more than a chronological
fact";135 it is a time when people are "most susceptible to influence and
to psychological damage";13 6 "it is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility,
'impetuousness[,] and recklessness';137 "[a]nd its 'signature qualities'
are all 'transient."' 38 The Court's own rationale for requiring individual-
ized consideration of juveniles when imposing the "[s]tate's harshest
penalties," demands extension, as "a sentencer misses too much if he
treats every child as an adult" in any sentencing scheme.1 39 This is espe-
cially true where "[t]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults ...
put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings."i1 40 Juve-
niles tend not to trust adults and are unable to comprehend the processes
and players associated with the justice system, such that juveniles do not
cooperate in their own defense-this leads to diminished quality of ad-
vocacy on a juvenile's behalf.14 1
consider the distinct needs and developmental level of each child offender, while providing ques-
tionable benefits, if any, to the country as a whole." (footnote omitted)).
131. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
71 (2010)).
132. Feld, supra note 1, at 129.
133. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
134. Dutton, supra note 16, at 200.
135. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115) (internal quotation mark omitted).
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
138. Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368).
139. Id. at 2468.
140. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
141. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
[Vol. 92:3578
2015] STATE V. BROWN AND JUVENILE SENTENCING
The Court's rationale, focusing on the juvenile offender, is transfer-
able to mandatory sentences other than a life without parole. In fact, the
Miller Court recognized the inherent transferability of its own rationale,
stating, "[N]one of what is said about children-about their distinctive
(and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is
crime-specific." 4 2 The transferability of Miller's rationale to all juvenile
sentencing schemes is critical because the same dangers underlying the
Court's insistence upon individualized sentencing when considering the
imposition of life without parole on a juvenile are present in all other
mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes, including the imposition of un-
deserved and disproportionate sentences.143 Public policy would general-
ly necessitate an extension of the Court's rationale.'44
The Court employs one crime-specific inquiry in Miller. In cases of
mandatory life-without-parole sentences will juveniles serve "a greater
sentence than those adults [convicted of homicide] will serve." 45 Though
this consideration turns on the particular sentence rather than the juve-
nile's individual circumstances, this factor alone is not dispositive in
light of the Court's broader rationale.
Therefore, when determining whether to contain Miller's holding, it
remains critical to focus on the broader rationale to which the Court de-
voted its attention. This requires understanding the difference between
the legal argument the Miller Court used to extend individualized sen-
tencing to juveniles and the overarching rationale the Court employs as
the broader justification for such an extension. The Court first focused on
the harsh nature of mandatory life without parole to bridge two lines of
precedent and legitimize the extension of an individualized sentencing
requirement under death penalty jurisprudence; the Court's subsequent
discussion and stated reasons for extending the individualized sentencing
requirement, however, focused on the lesser culpability and youthful
status of the juveniles themselves. This is wholly transferable to all man-
datory juvenile sentencing schemes and is not foreclosed just because the
Miller Court was not asked to decide the constitutionality of such all
mandatory schemes.146 Subsequent courts must therefore be careful not
to lose sight of the rationale the Miller Court employed in reaching its
narrow outcome. To do so, would be to mistake the means-comparing
142. Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson:
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 372 (2013) (quoting
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68 ("Under these [mandatory] schemes, every juvenile will
receive the same sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the
accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one."); see
also Dutton, supra note 16, at 199-200.
144. Waldron, supra note 118, at 783-90 (recognizing that children are different).
145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
146. See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 110 ("[T]he majority opinion in Miller focused on the
inability of mandatory penalties to reflect individualized desert determinations, not on the absolute
length of the sentence.").
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life without parole and the death penalty to extend individualized sen-
tencing-for the end, which is simply not the case.
2. Standards for Individualized Consideration: Youthfulness a  a
Mitigating Factor
Of course, such individualized consideration is not synonymous
with loose or unbridled discretion; rather, it must be guided by the enu-
merated factors and overall spirit expressed in Miller.147 These factors
buttress, and cannot be divorced from, the Court's holding, and for that
reason, should guide subsequent courts in consideration of juvenile of-
fenders.148 There may be some concern-arguably well-founded concern,
given lower courts' application of Miller-that the Miller decision has
opened the door to unbridled discretion when courts conduct individual
considerations in sentencing juveniles to life without parole.149 However,
correct application of individualized sentencing under Miller limits this
possibility and requires, at least, that the factors of youth mitigate the
severity of the crime on behalf of a juvenile, not provide a basis to ag-
gravate a sentence.150
The Miller Court, echoing jurisprudence, outlines four mitigating
factors: (1) "chronological age and its hallmark features-among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequenc-
es";151 (2) background, including family and home environment; (3)
mental and emotional development; and (4) circumstances of the crime,
"including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way fa-
milial and peer pressures may have affected him." 5 2 It is important to
note, the Miller Court assesses these factors with a careful eye towards
how they advocate on behalf of a juvenile,153 after noting the objective,
scientific fact that youth have a "diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change."54 Thus, while the Court engages a subjective anal-
ysis of the juvenile offenders' family background and environment and
the particularities of the offenders' crimes, the Court focuses only on the
147. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467; see Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth:
Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 50 (2013) ("[I]ndividual assessments made
without any guidance can lead to arbitrary and capricious decision-making, an issue that has plagued
transfer decisions.").
148. See Waldron, supra note 118, at 775 (noting, in its discussion of Miller that
"[i]ndividualized review is a comprehensive approach to juvenile sentencing, under which a court
must consider mitigating factors such as susceptibility to peer pressure, underdeveloped brains, and
traumatic life stories").
149. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 510 ("Miller, with its mandate of individualized considera-
tion at sentencing, reopens the door to all of the malignity of subjective decision-making and its
fruits.").
150. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (requiring courts, before imposing sentences of life without
parole, to "take into account how children are different").
151. Straley, supra note 1, at 995 n. 181 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468).
152. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
153. Id. at 2468-69.
154. See id
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mitigating aspects of those factors. For example, the Court observed one
of the offenders, Jackson, had a background of family "immersion in
violence," after noting that a juvenile cannot remove himself from cer-
tain family situations, "no matter how brutal or dysfunctional."15 This
provides guidance as to how these factors should be weighed by subse-
quent courts, as the Miller Court appears to affirm the Roper Court's
mandate that a juvenile offender's youthfulness not be "counted against
him,"156 but instead work on his behalf. There is no reason subsequent
courts should fail to do otherwise,57 and these factors, and their mitigat-
ing purpose, must be strictly employed by courts to mitigate harsh sen-
tences, not exacerbate them.
1II. STATE V. BROWN
While Miller's rationale for individualized consideration of youthful
offenders is applicable to all juvenile sentencing proceedings, a wave of
subsequent decisions reveal the tendency to limit Miller's reach. Illustrat-
ing this trend is State v. Brown.'58 Interpreting Miller, the Kansas Su-
preme Court held that a mandatory hard twenty life sentence was not
unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment principles.159 In Brown, a
juvenile offender appealed her conviction for "felony murder and at-
tempted aggravated robbery."160 The juvenile appealed on multiple
grounds, including: (1) improper "juvenile jurisdiction waiver",;'6 1 and
(2) an unconstitutional sentence in light of the Miller v. Alabama rul-
ing.162
A. Facts
Keaira Brown was thirteen years old when she allegedly shot six-
teen-year-old Scott Sappintgon, Jr. at point-blank range in an attempted
robbery.'63 In light of fingerprints, DNA evidence, and eyewitness ac-
counts connecting her to bloody clothing and to the scene of the crime,
Brown was charged with felony murder based on the offense of attempt-
ed aggravated robbery.1 6 The state sought "authorization to prosecute
Brown as an adult," 65 under a statute that presumed a juvenile to be a
juvenile "unless good cause [was] shown to prosecute the juvenile as an
155. Id at 2468.
156. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 508 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
157. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
158. 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014).
159. Idat797.
160. Id at 785.
161. Id. at 785-86.
162. Id. at 786.
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adult."1 6 6 The district court waived juvenile jurisdiction using an eight-
factor test that considered the following:
"(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protec-
tion of the community requires prosecution as an adult .. .;
"(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, vi-
olent, premeditated or willful manner;
"(3) whether the offense was against a person or against property[,]
[with] [g]reater weight . . . given to offenses against persons ... ;
"(4) the number of alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending
against the juvenile;
"(5) the previous history of the juvenile, including ... whether [prior]
offenses were against persons or property ... ;
"(6) the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional atti-
tude, pattern of living or desire to be treated as an adult;
"(7) whether there are facilities or programs available to the court
which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of
the court's jurisdiction . . ; and
"(8) whether the interests of the juvenile or of the community would
be better served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction ju-
venile prosecution.167
In consideration of these factors the court placed emphasis on the
serious nature of the crime, as it was committed against another person
and was particularly violent.168 These conclusions were weighed against
a finding that the evidence "fell short of establishing a likelihood Brown
could be rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expired."1 69 The court
found Brown could not be rehabilitated after testimony from a psycholo-
gist that Brown's numerous behavioral disorders could be rehabilitated in
the seven years the system had left to "work with her,"l70 but that be-
cause she had "become[] aggressive at 13, [she had] a statistically greater
risk of reoffending than one who becomes aggressive at 17." 171 With
specific regard to the maturity factor, however, the court made oral find-
ings that the evidence supported a "wash"; there were "aspects of Miss
Brown that [were] 13 years of age, and there [were] aspects of her that
166. Id. at 789 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
167. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2014)).
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[were] an adult age."l72 Here "the court did not find the evidence of
Brown's maturity level was enough to consider that factor in the analy-
sis."l 73 Brown's history also supported waiver of jurisdiction, where she
had fired a gun and thrown rocks at a car in an altercation, hit her aunt
with an iron, and sustained "57 disciplinary infractions" while housed in
the juvenile detention center.174 The court then made a more matter-of-
fact finding that the community would be better protected through waiver
of such jurisdiction.7 5
B. The Kansas Supreme Court's Analysis
On appeal, Brown challenged three basic conclusions proffered by
the lower court with regard to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Brown
argued: (1) the court improperly gave her the burden of proof with regard
to showing the ability of rehabilitation; (2) the court erred in considering
the seriousness, violence nature, and against-a-person factors separately,
though their facts substantially overlapped; and (3) the court impermissi-
bly relied on the nature of the crime and her "grooming habits" in deter-
mining that her maturity went "beyond that of juvenile."1 76
While the Kansas Supreme Court did not use Miller in reviewing
the trial court's decision to transfer Brown, this Comment argues the
court's deference to the trial court's runaway discretion, when viewed in
light of the effects of juvenile transfer to adult court, nevertheless war-
rant the use of Miller's individual consideration requirement in all juve-
nile sentencing. First, the Kansas Supreme Court found the district court
did not improperly give Brown the burden of proof by considering
statements made by Brown's psychologist on cross-examination; reliance
on the psychologist's statements indicating various programs "could help
rehabilitate Brown," but that she would be a "challenging case," did not
fall outside the scope of permissible considerations in deciding the reha-
bilitation factor.177 Notably, however, the court took no issue with the
fact that Brown's age worked against her in that analysis.
Second, the court dismissed Brown's argument that separate con-
sideration of the first three factors was "duplicitous," resulting in an un-
reasonable weight in favor of transfer.178 The court framed each factor as
an inquiry that "concem[ed] different subject matter," where the serious-
ness of the crime related to the gravity, and the violence of the crime
172. Id at 790 (quoting the oral ruling of the district court).
173. Id. at 788.
174. Id. at 787.
175. Id. at 788.
176. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Stevens, 975 P.2d 801, 805 (Kan. 1999)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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related to the manner in which a grave crime may be committed.19 Here,
the court found no error in focusing a substantial amount of the analysis
on the crime, as long as each factor considered a theoretically different
facet of that crime.
Finally, with regard to Brown's arguments that the lower court im-
properly considered her crime and dress habits in concluding that her
maturity favored transfer, the court found both without merit." First, the
court permitted consideration of Brown's crime in relation to her maturi-
ty, because that factor was not given dispositive treatment by the lower
court. However, four of the eight factors considered in the transfer deci-
sion already involved assessing the nature of Brown's crime. Thus, it is
arguable that allowing one more factor to focus on the crime itself, which
often tipped a particular factor in favor of transfer, was dispositive in
effect, as it then pushed five of the eight factors towards transfer.8' Se-
cond, the court found no abuse in the lower court's memorandum be-
cause the district court had specified that its oral findings, not the memo-
randum, were to control.182 Here, while the memorandum indicated "that
Brown's 'choice at her young age to adopt the grooming habits and
clothing of a boy are . . . indications of a [more] mature attitude,"' the
Kansas Supreme Court focused its review on the oral findings as directed
by the lower court and found no abuse of discretion in those findings,
however sparse the lower court's oral analysis had proved.183 The court
therefore affirmed the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.184
At trial, Brown was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory "hard
20 life sentence for [felony] murder and a concurrent 32-month sentence
for attempted aggravated robbery."'85 After affirming the waiver of juve-
nile jurisdiction, the court considered the constitutionality of Brown's
mandatory hard twenty life sentence in light of Miller.
Brown argued that because she was a minor and the mandatory sen-
tencing scheme failed to consider her age, the imposition of her hard
twenty life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller.186 Nonetheless,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that such a sentence did not fall within
the Miller holding.187 To find "mandatory life-with-parole sentences [as
applied to juveniles] are unconstitutional," it asserted, required an unwar-
ranted extension of the Miller decision.'8 8 Specifically, the court rea-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 790-91.
181. See id. at 789, 791.
182. Id.at788.
183. Id. at 791 (second alteration in original) (quoting memorandum opinion of the district
court).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 786.
186. Id. at 796-97.
187. Id. at 797.
188. Id.
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soned that Miller was premised on notions of lessened juvenile culpabil-
ity and the analogous nature of "juvenile life without parole sentences to
capital punishment."l89 Specifically, the court noted that a mandatory
hard twenty life did not meet the same threshold of severity as to justify
elevating the sentence to life-without-parole status and trigger Miller's
applicability; the "parallels between life-without-parole sentences and
the death penalty" were not present in a life with parole sentence.90
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the opportunity to ex-
tend Miller's decision, yet found Miller's rationale "inapplicable," where
"[a] hard 20 life sentence [did] not irrevocably adjudge a juvenile of-
fender unfit for society."'9'
IV. STATES ARE SLOWLY DISMANTLING MILLER
In the aftermath of Miller, twenty-nine state sentencing statutes, im-
posing mandatory life without parole, were invalidated as applied to ju-
veniles.192 This requisite response, however, was not the end-all-be-all
with regard to Miller's reach in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Many
courts and state legislatures have grappled, and will continue to grapple,
with other pertinent issues implicated in Miller's broad rationale.193 As
predicted, subsequent decisions by federal circuits, state supreme courts,
and legislatures have created a tug-of-war over both the retroactivity of
Miller,19 4 the extent to which Miller's principles extend, if at all, to pun-
189. Id. at 796-97.
190. Id. at 797.
191. Id.
192. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 396.
193. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of
Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 38 (2012) ("At some point the Supreme
Court may condescend to clarify whether long prison sentences hould be deemed LWOP for pur-
poses of Graham and Miller.").
194. While retroactivity is a separate, complex legal doctrine, it has been considered among the
ways in which subsequent courts limit Miller's reach by foreclosing all meaningful opportunity for
release for juveniles sentenced to life without parole before Miller. Recent Case, supra note 13, at
1256 (noting the effects of not applying Miller retroactively: "[M]any defendants who were sen-
tenced as juveniles-with all the mitigating propensities of youth-will not be afforded individual-
ized sentencing hearings simply because of the timing of their decisions, rather than because they are
not constitutionally entitled to such protection."); see also Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26
(recognizing that Miller left courts "without guidance when considering whether this ruling should
be applied retroactively").
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana in March 2015 to resolve the
split amongst the states on this issue. State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014) (mem.), cert.
granted, sub nom. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015). Some courts have declared
that Miller applies retroactively. See, e.g., Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 240 (1st Cir.
2014) (finding, in light of the government's concession, a prima facie showing that Miller applies
retroactively); In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a "prima facie showing
that Miller is retroactive"); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding,
after the government conceded retroactivity, a primafacie showing that Miller applies retroactively);
Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Conn. 2015) ("We conclude that the rule an-
nounced in Miller is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that must be applied retroactively.");
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 962 (Fla. 2015) (finding Miller applies retroactively); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (holding Miller applies retroactively); State v. Mantich,
842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) ("Because the rule announced in Miller is more substantive than
procedural and because the Court has already applied that rule to a case on collateral review, we
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ishments other than mandatory life without parole,195 and even juvenile
transfer decisions.1 96
As a result, the Miller decision has become the pinnacle of contro-
versy and uncertainty regarding juvenile sentencing, not as much by rea-
son of its holding, but rather, by reason of its potentially applicable ra-
tionale to further limit juvenile sentencing options.197 Because "the Su-
preme Court failed to specify what sentencing guidelines should dictate .
states and courts [are] without guidance when determining the appro-
priate sentence for juveniles convicted of violent crimes." 98 Now, three
years after Miller, the instruction of hindsight reveals a wave of state and
federal decisions reluctantly addressing Miller and limiting its reach by
applying only its narrowest holding.
A. Incrementally Avoiding Miller
State courts and legislatures have scrambled to find constitutionally
viable sentencing schemes for juveniles convicted of murder "in place of
mandatory life without parole." 99 Most states, indicative of both uncer-
conclude that the rule announced in Miller applies retroactively . . . ."); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487
(Wyo. 2014) (stating that Miller is, "despite its procedural aspects, a substantive rule"). Other courts
have held that Miller does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226
(4th Cir. 2015) ("We therefore hold that the Supreme Court has not held the Miller rule retroactively
applicable, and that the Court's holdings do not dictate retroactivity because the rule is neither sub-
stantive nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure."); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.
2013) (finding Miller did not apply retroactively); People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 972 (Colo. 2015)
("Because Miller is procedural in nature, and is not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it does not
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment."); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829,
831 (La. 2013) ("[W]e find Miller does not apply retroactively in cases on collateral review as it
merely sets forth a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure .... ); Martin v. State, 865 N.W.2d
282, 292 (Minn. 2015) (holding "Miller does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose LWOR
sentence became final before the Miller rule was announced"); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311,
331 (Minn. 2013) (concluding the defendant was "not entitled to the retroactive benefit of the Miller
rule in a postconviction proceeding); Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629, 642 (Mont. 2015) (holding Miller
did not apply retroactively).
195. Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto
Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3439, 3457-77 (2014); see also Elisabeth A. Archer, Note, Establishing Principled Interpreta-
tion Standards in Iowa's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Jurisprudence, 100 IOWA L. REV. 323,
325, 338 (2014) (arguing the Iowa Supreme Court failed when it agreed with "[d]efendant Denem
Anthony Null [who] alleged that his 75-year sentence, with parole eligibility after 52.5 years, consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller
v. Alabama").
196. Laura Cohen, Freedom s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and
Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDoZO L. REV. 1031, 1060 (2014).
197. Scavone, supra note 197, at 3441-42 ("The narrow holding of Miller has left several
residual questions regarding the future ofjuvenile sentencing and how states should incorporate both
the Miller and Graham decisions into their sentencing structure. . . . Responses in state courts to the
issue of virtual LWOP sentences after Miller and Graham have varied significantly." (footnote
omitted)); see also Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is
Not, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2013) ("Some courts have refused to apply Miller at all, conclud-
ing that it is not retroactive. Other courts have ignored the decision's broad themes, focusing instead
on its narrow holding and going so far as to reaffirm lengthy sentences for juveniles after an ostensi-
bly 'individualized' determination." (footnote omitted)).
198. See Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26.
199. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 389.
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tainty and a refusal to see juvenile offenders as categorically different
than adult criminals, have simply imposed the "next most severe statuto-
ry sentence available for that offense."20 Under the guise of judicial min-
imalism, courts express an unwillingness to consider the Miller rationale
in juvenile sentencing, making incrementally nominal decisions to avoid
its application. This avoidance is most evident in transfer decisions and
sentencing mechanisms, which have contained Miller to its narrow hold-
ing. This Comment first considers transfer mechanisms.
1. Transfer Mechanisms-Out of Miller's Reach: When Mandatory
Juvenile Sentencing Depends on Charging Juveniles as Adults
"A transfer order is described as the harshest sanction that may be
imposed on a juvenile offender. . . .,,201 At first glance, this may appear
to be an interesting assertion considering the notion that an actual term-
of-years sentence is the traditional notion of a "sanction" imposed on
202criminal offenders2. However, this is only a surprising argument if
charging and sentencing are viewed as two separate decisions, each ex-
isting in a vacuum.203 But this is not the case. Charges dictate sentencing
in the adult criminal system; they focus on the crime of an offender and
trigger certain permissible or mandatory sentences corresponding to that
crime once guilt is determined. Therefore, when a juvenile is transferred
to adult jurisdiction, the effect is this: the focus shifts from the individual
juvenile and their mitigating circumstances to the crime committed.204
And as a result, charging a juvenile as an adult causes "significant adult
sentences" to automatically attach to that youth upon conviction for the
205charged offense, regardless of individual circumstances. For these rea-
200. Id.
201. Cintron, supra note 39, at 1261; see also Hess, supra note 56, at 317 ("The Court [has]
recognized that the question of whether to transfer a child to adult court is 'critically important'
because it involves 'tremendous consequences,' including that the 'child will be deprived of the
special protections and provisions' of the juvenile court." (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 553-54 (1966))).
202. See Samuel Marion Davis, The Criminalization ofJuvenile Justice: Legislative Responses
to "The Phantom Menace, " 70 Miss. L.J. 1, 18 (2000) ("Punitive options are available to criminal
courts . . . .").
203. See Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 93-94, 101-04 (asserting that ransfer mechanisms are
the "processes that allow juveniles to be sentenced to lengthy sentences to begin with," and that
"mandatory sentencing schemes [are invoked] upon transfer"); see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Juries
for Juveniles, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 291, 292-94 (2013) (recognizing the inherent connection be-
tween juvenile transfer or charging decisions and subsequent adult sentences imposed on juveniles).
204. Hamack, supra note 37, at 791 ("Because these waiver schemes trigger transfer based on
the charged offense and the juvenile's age, they fail to focus on the individualized needs of the
juvenile over the offense allegedly committed, thus failing to value rehabilitation over punish-
ment."); see Tunnard, supra note 10, at 1332 ("Transfer decisions often leave the judge a choice
between the light punishment of the juvenile system and the standardized sentencing for adults.
Since a judge making the transfer decision will likely determine that a minor deserves a harsher
sentence than he would receive in juvenile court, the importance of a sentencing judge's considera-
tion of juvenile mitigation becomes paramount." (footnotes omitted)).
205. Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 391 (1998); see also
587
588 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:3
sons, transfer mechanisms are determinative of juvenile sentencing.206
Transfer mechanisms not only implicate Miller's rationale, but also serve
to dismantle it by removing juveniles to a system that will not account
for their individual, youthful circumstances.20 7
Though "challenges brought against mandatory transfer laws have
largely failed on the notion that treatment in juvenile court is not a right,"
this does not foreclose application of Miller's Eighth Amendment ra-
tionale where the logic and necessity to do so exist.208 The Miller ra-
tionale should be applied to transfer mechanisms because juvenile trans-
fers are determinative of sentencing:209 The Miller rationale applies to
harsh, mandatory sentencing schemes imposed on youth, and nothing
triggers the harsh mandatory sentencing of a youth like transfer mecha-
210nisms. Such mechanisms therefore fall within the contemplation of the
Miller rationale, because where the "concerns [associated] with mandato-
ry juvenile life without parole are the same as those with transfer," the
need to focus on the youth's age as a mitigating factor in such decisions
is just as critical.2 11 And Miller is the polestar case, providing guidance
for how courts must treat juveniles differently in transfer decisions.212
However, the Miller rationale is categorically undermined by state
transfer mechanisms. Mandatory transfer schemes are the most obvious
in their operation as instruments that are offensive to the Miller rationale
since the lack of meaningful consideration with regard to a juvenile's
status as a juvenile is prescribed in these transfers.2 13 Of course, as the
Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 52 (referring to Miller in stating that "Miller had been transferred from
juvenile court, found guilty, and automatically sentenced to life without parole")
206. But see State v. Mays, 18 N.E.3d 850, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) ("[M]andatory bindover
does not equate to punishment any more than the mere prosecution of an adult in the common pleas
court constitutes punishment." (quoting State v. Quarterman, No. 26400, 2013 WL 4506970 at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013) (Carr, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. See Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why
the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony
Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013).
208. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 51, 54 (asserting that the individualization rationale used
in Graham and Miller is applicable to mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court). But see Knox,
supra note 43, at 1269 ("[S]tatutes in every state create a statutory entitlement to adjudication in
courts specialized to deal with delinquency.").
209. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 51.
210. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 101 (discussing the effects of transfer mechanisms, saying
that "[o]nce in adult proceedings, juveniles are subject to mandatory sentencing laws and, in some
states, are incarcerated with adults").
211. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53 (noting that although the Miller Court was discussing
mandatory sentencing, the same language would apply to juvenile transfer, where the Court finds
"criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed." (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
212. Id. at 30; see Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 32 (arguing for the application of death penalty
jurisprudence to juvenile transfer to provide guidance to judges, where "the evidence is clear that
both judges and prosecutors make arbitrary and capricious decisions").
213. Id. at 50 ("Both methods of mandatory transfer result in a juvenile's case being filed in
adult court without a hearing and without individualized consideration of the juvenile's circumstanc-
es."); see also Shitama, supra note 209, at 830 ("The Supreme Court in Miller noted that of the
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Brown case illustrates, regardless of whether automatic or permissible at
the discretion of a judge or the prosecution,214 all transfer mechanisms
dictate the nature of available sentences to a juvenile offender, as the
Brown court's transfer of Brown to adult court jurisdiction triggered her
hard twenty sentence. Juvenile transfer should therefore trigger the same
meaningful consideration of the mitigating factors of youthfulness refer-
enced in Miller,215 because meaningful individualized consideration is
not guaranteed at the transfer stage, the adult sentencing process is not
itself individualized, and the Miller rationale is equally undermined by
the consequences of the transfer.216 The offensive operation of mandatory
transfers has already been addressed by academics in relation to the Mil-
ler decision.2 17 Therefore, this Comment's discussion of state transfer
mechanisms and their diluting effect on the Miller rationale is limited to
discretion-based judicial waivers. These waivers effectively label juve-
niles as adults and preclude individualized consideration in sentencing.
Even the Miller Court questions whether discretionary transfer laws "ad-
equately address the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders,"218 not-
ing that discretionary transfer "has limited utility, because the deci-
sionmaker typically will have only partial information about the child or
the circumstances of his offense."2 19
Once juvenile jurisdiction has been waived, the already-attached
"adult" label precludes more guided and informed consideration of the
juvenile when it comes to sentencing, because "once [a juvenile is] con-
victed in adult court, mandatory sentencing laws proscribe age and other
mitigating factors from weighing in the determination of a child offend-
er's punishment."220 This occurs even when the transfer decision in-
volves the balancing of various individual-related factors, because the
broad discretion of the court or prosecution is not effectively policed by
clear legislative mandates, creating the risk that courts may make arbi-
twenty-nine jurisdictions that impose mandatory life without parole on juveniles, 'about half' have
mandatory transfer laws that 'place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult court automat-
ically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer [back] to juvenile court."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474)).
214. Davis, supra note 204, at 6-8 (discussing the circumstances under which "[t]he vast
majority of states . . . provide for waiver by the juvenile court"); see also Tamara L. Reno, Com-
ment, The Rebuttable Presumption for Serious Juvenile Crimes: An Alternative to Determinate
Sentencing in Texas, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1995) ("The increase in serious juvenile
crime prompted at least twenty states in 1994 to attempt to reform their juvenile codes to prosecute
more serious juvenile offenders as adults.").
215. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
216. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 94 ("[I]n order to give full effect to its reasoning in Miller,
the Supreme Court needs to abolish . .. [even] discretion[ary] transfers, and mandatory sentencing
schemes upon transfer."); see also id. at 105 ("Even if a judge deems that transfer is in the interest of
the offender and society, juveniles should be exempt from mandatory sentencing schemes.").
217. See, e.g., Shitama, supra note 209, at 830.
218. Tunnard, supra note 10, at 1332.
219. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
220. Shitama, supra note 209, at 831.
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trary and capricious decisions about who to send to adult court.221 And,
as demonstrated in Brown, review of transfer decisions usually involves
deference to the lower court's analysis of the evidence.222 Even if transfer
decisions were more effectively guided by state law, it is often true that
the "transfer hearing [itself is] an inadequate place for [a] judge to learn
much about the juvenile before him in terms of his ultimate disposition in
the adult system.",2 23 As a result, judges do not effectively consider miti-
224
gating circumstances and are not required, by statute, to do so.
Despite the risks of wrongful transfer even when individualized
consideration is given, a juvenile offender is irreversibly labeled an adult
once transfer determinations are made. This forecloses any chance the
youth may have at considerations of mitigating factors in the sentencing
process, where sentences automatically attach upon conviction for par-
ticular crimes.225 Other than the categorical bans on the death penalty and
life without parole for nonhomicidal offenses, juveniles are adults in
226
every sense of the word after the transfer order is issued. In a system
that ties the charged crime to a sentence and is dedicated to the motto,
"[c]ommit an adult crime, do adult time,227 juvenile transfers have be-
come a means of sentencing youth to the adult fate before they ever re-
ceive a term-of-years at a formal sentencing hearing. Miller's rationale
makes it clear that the harsh consequences of juvenile transfer must be
mitigated by a more guided consideration of the offender's youthful sta-
tus.
i. Transfer Mechanism in State v. Brown
State v. Brown illustrates the need for strict guidance in juvenile
transfer. In Brown, the Kansas Supreme Court undermined Miller's ra-
tionale by affirming the transfer of juvenile jurisdiction despite the argu-
ably misguided use of discretion by the lower court and regardless of the
decision's harsh consequence. The trial court ignored the presumption in
favor of continued juvenile jurisdiction and failed to consider all statuto-
rily prescribed factors in that light. 228 The Kansas Supreme Court, upon
review for such abuse,229 approved this unbridled judgment. As a result
221. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 47.
222. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 791 (Kan. 2014).
223. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 60.
224. See id at 56 ("[T]he courts and the states have put almost no work into guiding discretion
in judicial transfer decisions.").
225. Shitama, supra note 209, at 831.
226. See Robert Visca, Comment, An Evolving Society: The Juvenile's Constitutional Right
Against a Mandatory Sentence of Life (and Death) in Prison, 9 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 159, 167
(2013).
227. Klein, supra note 207, at 372.
228. See State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 789 (Kan. 2014) ("The juvenile shall be presumed to be
a juvenile unless good cause is shown to prosecute the juvenile as an adult." (quoting KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014))).
229. Id. at 787 ("On appeal, that decision is subject to a dual standard of review. The district
court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence. But the district court's
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of these incremental decisions, Brown was charged as an adult for her
crimes and received the corresponding mandatory sentence for those
crimes, with no individual consideration of her youthfulness.230
a. The Lower Court
The Brown trial court did not give proper consideration to the juve-
nile-related statutory factors required in transfer decisions for juve-
231niles. Starting with a presumption of juvenile jurisdiction, the factors
were designed to discourage transfer unless the circumstances, after con-
sidering each factor meaningfully, demanded otherwise.232 However, the
trial court considered each factor in relation to the crime thirteen-year-
old Brown committed and not in light of her youthfulness,233 thus failing
to give the factors proper weight in terms of their mitigating effect and
-234their presumption.
Turning to the statutory factors, only four of the eight factors re-
quired consideration of the individual juvenile offender: the unadjudicat-
ed offenses pending against the youth; the history of the juvenile with
regard to that juvenile's particular crimes; the maturity of the offender
(which still allowed consideration of the committed crime, per the Kan-
sas Supreme Court's ruling in Brown); and the possible rehabilitation of
the offender.235 These factors will be referred to as the "juvenile-related"
factors. For the sake of leniency, one might suggest the final factor con-
sidered the individual juvenile, instructing the court o analyze whether
the "interests of the juvenile or of the community would be better served
by criminal prosecution."236 However, as seen in Brown, this factor re-
ceives only lip service where the court limits its consideration to the in-
terests of the community, not the best interests of Brown.237 The remain-
assessment of the eight statutory factors, which is based upon proved facts, should be reviewed for
an abuse of discretion." (citations omitted)).
230. See id. at 796.
231. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 56-60 (discussing the need for increased guidance within
statutory factors, where such factors have become increasingly empty in light of unbridled judicial
discretion).
232. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014).
233. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788 ("Ruling from the bench, the district court waived juvenile
jurisdiction. It cited the seriousness of the offense; that the offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, and willful manner; that it was a person offense; that the evidence fell short of establishing a
likelihood Brown could be rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expired; and that the interest of
the community, i.e., community protection, would be better served waiving juvenile jurisdiction.").
234. This is arguably a statutory failure and a flawed manner in which to make transfer deter-
minations. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 58-59 (discussing how statutory frameworks and criteria
for determining transfer provide judges with "standardless discretion" (quoting Barry C. Feld, Legis-
lative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFERS OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 90, 90
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
235. Brown, 331 P.3d at 789.
236. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e)(8) (2014).
237. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
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ing statutory factors considered the crime committed and the criminal
tendencies of the juvenile offender.
Using the four juvenile-related factors, the trial court dismissed sub-
stantial evidence of Brown's mitigating circumstances with regard to
Brown's history, maturity, and potential for rehabilitation, while clinging
to evidence regarding the crime itself.23 8 Where the Miller Court dis-
cussed the history of abuse, family environment, and youthful inability to
spot consequence as mitigating factors,239 the trial court's analysis of the
prior offenses factor was a one-dimensional consideration of Brown's
prior behavioral problems. The analysis ignored possible age-related and
background circumstances that perhaps informed Brown's offenses; her
mother's incarceration and Brown's own "conduct disorder," accompa-
nied by depression and multiple suicide attempts were left completely
out of the analysis, and the court found that Brown's criminal history
weighed in favor of transfer.2 40 This is, at best, a superficial consideration
of Brown's individual, mitigating circumstances,24' and illuminates the
need for strict guidance in juvenile transfer decisions.
The court also failed to give proper mitigating weight to evidence
concerning Brown's maturity by focusing on her crime. Evidence of
Brown's maturity from Brown's father and a psychologist supported
juvenile jurisdiction, where at least some of Brown's behavior-and
most of the evidence the trial court assessed, other than her crimes-was
consistent with a girl her age and "inconsistent with someone trying to
present themselves as equal to adults."242 The court ruled the maturity
factor a "wash." 243 In doing so, the court denied that it considered the
nature of Brown's crime dispositive. However, the court primarily relied
on the circumstances of the crime to determine Brown should be adjudi-
cated as an adult.244 This not only offends the Miller rationale, which
recognizes the general lack of maturity of juvenile offenders,2 45 but re-
238. See id.
239. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468-69 (2012).
240. Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
241. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 850 (explaining, that in light of Miller, "trial courts
should conduct these sentencing hearings with the understanding that 'full consideration' of evi-
dence that mitigates against life without parole should be considered by the sentencing body so that
it may 'give a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime.' (quot-
ing Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Re-
sponses in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 237, 243 (2007))).
242. Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
243. Id. at 790 (quoting oral ruling of the district court).
244. Id. at 791 (discussing the maturity factor the Brown court asserts that "[lt]he Court is
careful not to rely too heavily on the adult-like nature of the crime charged. While the Court does
believe that it is relevant to the factor, it is clear in a large majority of waiver cases the crime will fit,
by level of violence or planning or some other measure, into adult-type behavior. In this case, it
certainly did. For a person to arm themselves, calmly approach a scene, slay a young man and then
calmly leave the scene and dispose of incriminating evidence all are very adult activities" (quoting
memorandum opinion of the district court) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
245. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53.
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veals the lack of substantial evidence in favor of transfer when consider-
ing Brown apart from her crime.246
In addition, the court ignored evidence concerning Brown's poten-
tial for rehabilitation. Finding an "absence of evidence" with regard to
the possibility of rehabilitation, the court ruled this factor weighed in
favor of transfer.247 This ruling, however, was contrary to testimony by a
psychologist that "it was possible to change Brown's behavior because
she was still in her formative years and the juvenile system still had al-
most 7 years to work with her."2 48 While additional evidence indicated
Brown would be a "challenging case,"249 this did not substantiate a find-
ing that the rehabilitation factor supported transfer, especially in light of
a presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction. Therefore, the court's
improper consideration of the juvenile-related factors not only offended
the statutory presumption in Brown's favor, but directly undermined
Miller's mandate that individualized consideration mitigate on behalf of
a juvenile offender.250 While transfer orders-discretion-based transfers
by judicial waiver-have the appearance of legitimacy in their individu-
alized determination that a juvenile should not be a youth in the eyes of
the law, such an order hardly embodies the meaningful consideration
contemplated by Miller if it fails to appropriate proper weight to mitigat-
ing circumstances of the juvenile, as was the case in Brown.251
Also, the court committed an abuse of discretion by applying
252Brown's age when convenient to support a waiver. Both the Kansas
statute and common sense mandate that the presumption of youthfulness
and lack of maturity exists with regard to a thirteen-year-old unless the
evidence clearly indicates otherwise; the court, however, appeared to
forego this presumption in favor of an unwarranted evidentiary stalemate
253
with regard to Brown's maturity. Brown was thirteen; she clearly
"looked to her mother for responses during . . . evaluation[,] . . . some-
thing [her psychologist said] a girl her age would do and [something]
inconsistent with someone trying to present themselves as equal to
246. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 791 (using a subsequent written report, to make its only finding as
to Brown's maturity weighing in favor of transfer, where Brown's "choice at her young age to adopt
the grooming habits and clothing of a boy [were] indications of a [more] mature attitude" (alteration
in original) (quoting memorandum opinion of the district court) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
247. Id. at 790.
248. Id. at 788.
249. Id. at 790 (quoting trial testimony of Brown's psychologist) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("[C]onsidering that this factor weighed in favor of adult prosecution, the district court
relied on Cappo's cross-examination concessions that Brown would be a 'challenging case'.
(quoting trial testimony of Brown's psychologist)).
250. See Feld, supra note 1, at 135-36.
251. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 60 ("Given the stakes, the transfer hearing should, in fact,
allow the judge to learn as much as possible about the juvenile and his potential exposure in the adult
system before making the decision to transfer him.").
252. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
253. See id. at 790.
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adults."254 However, instead of allowing Brown's young age to mitigate
in favor of her lack of maturity, the court struck that factor from its anal-
ysis. 25 5 Should the evidence have actually been a "wash," the presump-
tion in favor of juvenile jurisdiction should have tipped the scales in fa-
vor of that presumed jurisdiction.256
The trial court had no problem reinstituting Brown's age into its
consideration of rehabilitation, however, when Brown's age conveniently
served to aggravate the possibility of rehabilitation. It is logical to con-
clude that the statutory presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction is
based on the rationale that younger children are more likely to undergo
successful rehabilitation, due to the young age at which they enter the
system.257 Thus, where a seventeen-year-old would not have been enti-
tled to the presumption of juvenile jurisdiction because the system had
less time to rehabilitate that juvenile.258 However, the court ignored this
rationale, and instead, afforded a hypothetical seventeen-year-old more
benefit of the doubt with regard to rehabilitation than thirteen-year-old
Brown, concluding that the early age at which Brown began her criminal
activity rendered her incapable of rehabilitation no matter how long the
system had to pursue such efforts.259 Regardless of the statutory pre-
sumption juvenile status afforded Brown as a thirteen-year-old offender,
the court leveraged her youthfulness against her, saying such aggressive-
ness at her young age made the road to rehabilitation harder than if she
would have been seventeen at the time of her crimes.260 Here, the court
inverted the presumption in favor of rehabilitating juveniles under the
age of fourteen. This is indicative of runaway discretion, as the lower
court gave only lip service to the text of the statute and completely ig-
nored its spirit.261 The presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction was
not sufficiently rebutted as to support transfer by the preponderance of
the evidence.
254. Id. at 788.
255. See id at 790-91 ("1 find-frankly that that [sophistication and maturity] factor is a wash.
I think there are reasons to believe that there are-are aspects of Miss Brown that are 13 years of
age, and there are aspects of her that are of an adult age. So I don't believe that is particularly helpful
in this case." (quoting oral ruling of the district court) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 66.
257. See id at 788, 790; see also Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which
Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-
State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 799 (2000).
258. See Beresford, supra note 261, at 799-800.
259. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
260. See id
261. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 58 ("'[A]pplication of the [statutory] factors that are
considered relevant to the amenability determination is often pretextual'; the judges are much more
interested in culpability and dangerousness." (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right:
Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 299, 330 (1999))).
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b. The Kansas Supreme Court
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision, although the record did not support
transfer by a preponderance of the evidence in light of a statutory pre-
sumption favoring juvenile jurisdiction. First, in reviewing the factual
findings with regard to the statutory factors, the Kansas Supreme Court
ignored "substantial competent evidence [that did] not support a finding
of fact on which the [lower court's] exercise of discretion [was]
based."262 While the lower court's factual findings regarding the crime-
related factors supported transfer, the lower court did not meaningfully
consider material evidence as to the juvenile-related factors, which
should have mitigated transfer.263 Though the Kansas Supreme Court was
not permitted to "reweigh the evidence," it is arguable the lower court
did not weigh the evidence at all, but rather ignored, misinterpreted, or
simply lacked evidence when making factual determinations with regard
to Brown's maturity and ability to be rehabilitated. These failures are
tantamount to substantial competent evidence not supporting the lower
court's use of discretion.26
And without knowing how the lower court weighed certain factors
in its analysis or by how much the evidence overcame the presumption in
favor of juvenile jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence,265 the
Kansas Supreme Court could not be sure whether an error in as to any
one factor would undermine the entire transfer determination. Neverthe-
less, the court quickly, and without discussion, disregards any error in the
lower court's findings regarding Brown's maturity as not warranting
reversal.266
Second, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's as-
sessment of the statutory factors, despite the lower court's abuse of dis-
cretion. Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard,267 and while this
Comment does not dispute the standard of review,268 failing to give full
force to statutory factors and evaluating these factors incorrectly is an
abuse no matter how broad the court's discretion. Although the lower
court was "not constrained by the insufficiency of evidence to support
one or more of the factors,"269 the Kansas Supreme Court was silent as to
the lower court's misapplication of factors, overreliance on the nature of
262. Brown, 331 P.3d at 791. ("Substantial competent evidence 'is evidence which possesses
both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues
can reasonably be resolved."' (quoting In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d 5, 11 (Kan. 2011))).
263. See id. at 787.
264. See id. at 787, 789-90.
265. Id. at 789.
266. Id. at 791.
267. Id. at 787.
268. This does, however, raise questions as to whether juvenile transfer decisions should be
afforded a different standard of review, given their sentencing-like consequences.
269. Brown, 331 P.3d at 787.
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the crime for five of the eight factors, and failure to consider the pre-
sumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction.
For example, the Kansas Supreme Court took scant notice of the
lower court's inversion of logic when considering the rehabilitation fac-
tor, which should have favored juvenile jurisdiction based on the statuto-
ry presumption associated with Brown's age. The court also affirmed the
lower court's heavy reliance on Brown's crime to draw conclusions
about her ability to be rehabilitated and to conclude her maturity was a
"wash." When three of the eight factors involve assessing a juvenile's
crime, the statute's failure to address the nature of the crime in the re-
maining factors appears deliberate, meaning courts must consider, at
least, the rehabilitation and maturity factors apart from the crime. Other-
wise, the factors would become so conflated as to render nearly all juve-
nile offenders deserving of transfer to adult court. The Kansas Supreme
Court dismissed the lower court's overreliance on the nature of the
crime, however, by reasoning that any consideration of the crime by the
lower court was not dispositive.270 This is incorrect, where the only evi-
dence in favor of transfer with regard to this factor, was the nature of
Brown's crime. Because this evidence contradicted evidence in Brown's
favor, thus rendering the factor a wash, the nature of Brown's crime was
arguably dispositive.
In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed an abuse of discre-
tion where the lower court improperly concluded Brown's maturity was a
"wash" in the analysis. The lower court found contradictory evidence of
Brown's maturity level, and the factor was effectively stricken from the
balancing process, despite suspicious contradictions between the lower
court's oral findings and after-the-fact written repor This should not
have been the case. The statute mandates consideration of each factor as
the Kansas Supreme Court itself pointed out in rebutting Brown's argu-
ment that the first three factors were repetitive.2 72 While calling the ma-
turity factor a wash is consideration in the most rudimentary sense, it is
arguable that no factor is a wash in light of the statutory presumption
favoring of juvenile jurisdiction. However, the lower court ultimately
ignored the presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction to strike the
factor from the analysis. This was a clear abuse of discretion.
As a result of transferring Brown without meaningful regard to her
mitigating circumstances or the statutory presumption in her favor, the
court effectively imposed a mandatory sentence based on the less-than-
individual consideration she was given at the transfer stage. Where Mil-
270. Id. at 91.
271. Brown, 331 P.3d at 790-91.
272. Id. at 790 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2014)). Arguably, this logic would
lead to the conclusion that certain evidence pertaining to Brown's maturity-looking to her mom for
responses-could also be used to show Brown was capable of being rehabilitated, but neither court
went as far as to draw this conclusion.
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ler insisted on using juvenile status to warrant consideration of individu-
al, mitigating circumstances,273 Brown used only the crime committed to
warrant feigned consideration of juvenile status. Where transfer deci-
sions are nearly tantamount to sentencing, the Brown Court undermined
Miller.
ii. Transfer Mechanisms in Other States
Per Brown's example, the situation repeats itself from state-to-state:
the district court exercises unbridled discretion in weighing factors;274 the
reviewing court rewards this use of discretion by loosely reviewing the
district court analysis for abuse; and the juvenile is transferred to adult
court and receives a mandatory sentence associated with that crime, as
long as it is not life without parole. Post-Miller courts and legislatures
have simply failed to make changes to mandatory or discretionary waiver
mechanisms and processes despite their harsh effect on juvenile sentenc-
es.
Pulling one example out of the many that exist, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals upheld a lower court's extensive focus on the juvenile's
crime and past crimes in deciding to transfer the youth to adult court.275
First, the statutory factors themselves, though requisite safeguards to
such discretionary transfers, made little room for the actual mitigating
circumstances of youth to factor into the analysis.276 Second, the court of
appeals aggravated this imbalanced consideration where it upheld an
analysis of each factor, especially culpability, based on the facts of the
crime rather than the mitigating principle of diminished juvenile culpa-
bility laid out in Miller and juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.277 Here, as
in State v. Brown, the circumstances of youth actually worked against he
juvenile offender.
Post-Miller courts have taken little interest in exercising more scru-
tiny upon review of lower court transfer decisions, allowing lower courts
to disregard, as inapplicable, factors that are statutorily required for con-
273. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
274. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 826 ("This [judicial waiver] gave judges wide authority to
intervene in the lives of juvenile offenders' in inconsistent and often intrusive ways.").
275. In re Welfare of C.K.R., No. A14-0514, 2014 WL 5507050, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
3, 2014).
276. See id. at *2 ("(1) [T]he seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protec-
tion, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, the
use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim; (2) the culpability of the child in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the child's participation in planning and carrying out the
offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the
child's prior record of delinquency; (4) the child's programming history, including the child's past
willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming; (5) the adequacy of the punish-
ment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and (6) the dispositional options
available for the child." (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 4 (2012))).
277. See id. at *3-4 (ignoring testimony about the mitigating factors of lessened brain devel-
opment in youth by concluding the particular juvenile offender "was not impaired and was not
coerced").
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sideration.278 For example, prior to State v. Brown, the Kansas Supreme
Court recognized the sufficiency of a statement by the trial court ac-
knowledging the requisite factors a judge must consider before transfer-
ring a juvenile to adult court. Stating that a judge need not make a formal
finding regarding each factor, the Kansas Supreme Court abdicated all
meaningful review in allowing the following statement to satisfy the
statutory requirements: "I am aware and did consider all of the statutory
factors in making the decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and
find the ones I put on the record outweigh the other factors if they're
even applicable."279 In that case, the only factors put on the record were
conclusory statements that the "juvenile [was] not amenable to being
treated further as a juvenile," and a quick reference to "[t]he seriousness
of these offenses, the fact that this offense occurred ten days to less than
two weeks after he was released from Lamed Correctional Facility, [and]
his long history with the court system."280 In a lackadaisical review, the
Kansas Supreme Court found this to be sufficient consideration of the
evidence to show "he need[ed] to be treated as an adult." 2 8 1
Moreover, post-Miller legislation has not changed as a result of a
codified rationale in favor of more structured individualized considera-
tion. "Currently, every state has at least one form of juvenile transfer,
and most states have multiple ways of imposing adult sanctions on juve-
nile offenders."282 Even worse, "forty-four states impose some form of
mandatory waiver,"283 where discretion is not even afforded a lower
court, regardless of the strength of a particular juvenile offender's miti-
gating circumstances. As a result, Miller has had little effect on transfer
decisions, even though transfer of juveniles to adult court is the neces-
284sary precursor to sentencing.
2. Refusing to Extend Miller: The Narrow Holding Versus the
Broad Rationale
As this Comment has argued, "[b]y mandating individualized sen-
tencing for juveniles facing [life without parole], the Court in Miller
opened the door to a much more thorough challenge of the current sys-
tem, namely the argument that all juveniles deserve individualized jus-
278. See, e.g., State v. Washington, No. C-130213, 2014 WL 4724684, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2014) ("Where there is no statutory requirement that the juvenile court separately identify
factors that are not applicable, it does not err if it fails to do so, as long as it has indicated, in the
record, the factors that it weighed in favor of or against transfer.").
279. Makthepharak v. State, 314 P.3d 876, 882 (Kan. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting oral
ruling of the district court) (internal quotation mark omitted).
280. Id. (quoting oral ruling of the district court).
281. See id.
282. Shitama, supra note 209, at 830.
283. Id.
284. Dutton, supra note 16, at 204 ("In Miller, the Court rejected the argument that transfer
determinations-by judge, prosecutor, or legislature-are sufficient to cool the mandatory nature of
the JLWOP sentences that were before the Court.").
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tice."285 The broader rationale of Miller is, "[i]n other words, [that] no
sentencing scheme that ignores age and its attendant circumstances
should determine the outcome of a juvenile case."286 Yet, this is not the
reach of Miller's narrow holding, which struck down mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles.287 As a result, courts and legisla-
tures have struggled with the vital correlation between Miller's broader
rationale and its narrow holding.288 Of course, in an attempt to avoid the
wide range of ramifications that ensue from the broader Miller rationale,
subsequent decisions have effectively served to contain Miller to its most
narrow application, however constitutionally questionable such contain-
ment may prove to be.289
Having already discussed the argument for extending Miller's ra-
tionale to some of the more severe juvenile sentences, much of that ar-
gument rooted in the original rehabilitative cry of juvenile courts them-
selves,290 it is necessary to discuss the well-crafted box courts and legis-
latures have used to enjoin Miller from expansion-focusing on courts
and subsequent litigation of issues related to Miller.291 The four sides of
this box are representative of the primary ways courts decline to extend
and undermine the Miller rationale: Side one will be discussed as the
"one-step-down but still mandatory" approach; side two will be ad-
dressed as the "non-mandatory out" approach; side three will cover the
"aggregated sentence" approach; and side four will discuss the other cre-
ative ways courts have withheld the Miller rationale from even its most
narrow application. However, it is important to note that even while the
narrow application of Miller undermines the Miller rationale in its own
right, many "new" sentencing schemes go a step further: many ensure a
functional equivalent of life without parole, revealing an insistence not
only upon containing Miller, but demolishing it as well. 2 92
In the wake of Miller, there was no doubt mandatory life without
parole was barred, and more than twenty state laws imposing such a sen-
285. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 97.
286. Id; see also Courtney Amelung, Endnote, Responding to the Ambiguity ofMiller v. Ala-
bama: The Time Has Come for States to Legislate for a Juvenile Restorative Justice Sentencing
Regime, 72 MD. L. REv. ENDNOTES 21, 50 (2013) ("The Court's decision in Miller has given states
the opportunity to legislate for restorative justice within the juvenile justice system.").
287. Lauren Kinell, Note and Comment, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States
Can Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 145, 148-49 (2013).
288. See Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26.
289. See Alexander L. Nostro, Comment, The Importance of an Expansive Deference to Miller
v. Alabama, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167, 179-83 (2013).
290. See Fuller, supra note 38, at 379-81; see also supra Part 1.
291. See David Siegel, What Hath Miller Wrought: Effective Representation of Juveniles in
Capital-Equivalent Proceedings, 39 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363, 368-69
(2013) (discussing how "the scope of the procedural protections-such as whether they are retroac-
tive, whether they extend to sentences for which there is a theoretical but not meaningful possibility
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tence were subsequently invalidated as applied to juveniles.293 In re
sponse, and without the immediate enactment of new legislation, many
courts are left to "remand . .. case[s] for further sentencing proceedings
to permit the factfinder to assess [an] applicant's sentence at (1) life with
the possibility of parole . . . or (2) life without parole after consideration
of applicant's individual conduct, circumstances, and character."2 94
While this posed minimal problems of interpretation within Miller's nar-
row scope, questions arise as to the reach of Miller's broad rationale
when various mandatory and non-mandatory life-with-parole sentences
are functionally equivalent to life without parole.295
B. One-Step-Down-But-Still-Mandatory Schemes
In light of such questions, courts and legislatures have nevertheless
contained Miller by allowing the imposition of other, albeit lesser, man-
datory sentences-the "one-step-down" approach. For example, in the
absence of legislation that is compliant with Miller's holding, courts
have allowed prosecutors to simply "sever the unconstitutional language
in [the sentencing codes] as applied to juveniles convicted of [a particu-
lar crime]" that originally called for mandatory life without parole.296
Courts may simply "remand the case for [a juvenile offender] to be re-
sentenced on his conviction under the sentencing range provided for [the
same class felony], in accordance with the remaining language in [the]
subsection,"297 or sentence the juvenile in accordance with some other
mandatory scheme supplied by the legislature after Miller.
2 9 8
Depending on the statute, this approach may lead to the imposition
of a mandatory term of years sentence or a sentence with a mandatory
293. Amelung, supra note 290, at 32; see also Fuller, supra note 38, at 401.
294. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
295. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (2015) (discussing that an aggregate sen-
tence, imposed in the court's discretion and which was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life
without the possibility of release,was unconstitutional under Miller, after reading Miller "as impact-
ing two aspects of sentencing: (1) that a lesser sentence than life without parole must be available for
a juvenile offender; and (2) that the sentencer must consider age related evidence as mitigation when
deciding whether to irrevocably sentence juvenile offenders to a lifetime in prison"); see also Ame-
lung, supra note 290, at 34.
296. Whiteside v. State, 426 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y for Suf-
folk Dist., I N.E.3d 270, 286 (Mass. 2013).
297. Whiteside, 426 S.W.3d at 920; see also Commonwealth v. Brown, I N.E.3d 259, 268
(Mass. 2013) (excising the portion of the sentencing statute prohibiting parole eligibility when
applied to a juvenile). But see People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 965 (Colo. 2015) ("[W]e hold that the
proper remedy after Miller is to vacate a defendant's LWOP and to remand the case to the trial court
to determine whether LWOP is an appropriate sentence given the defendant's 'youth and attendant
circumstances."' (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)).
298. St. Val v. State, 174 So. 3d 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (finding a mandatory min-
imum sentence of twenty-five years did not violate Miller); People v. Banks, 36 N.E.3d 432, 437 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (finding a mandatory minimum of forty-five years did not violate Miller); Common-
wealth v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa.
2015) (holding a mandatory minimum of thirty-five years did not violate Miller, where an "argument
against a mandatory minimum of 35 years presents the same concerns as would a mandatory mini-
mum of 35 days' imprisonment," such that it would prohibit any mandatory scheme).
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minimum and a discretionary range. For example, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held the applicable sentencing range, after severing the unconstitu-
tional language and remanding the case, was ten to forty years or life.299
Even in cases where courts remand the case for consideration of an indi-
vidual defendant's youthfulness to determine the appropriateness of life
without parole, these courts may still apply a one-step-down approach if,
on remand, it is determined that life without parole is inappropriate.3
This raises questions as to whether one-step-down mandatory sen-
tencing schemes are unconstitutional under Miller, since all mandatory
sentencing processes are implicated by the same rationale Miller em-
ployed to strike down mandatory life without parole.301 However, many
courts, like the Brown court, were not inclined to extend Miller's holding
to mandatory sentences other than mandatory life without parole. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that life with the possibility of parole is an
appropriate and constitutional sentence under Miller once a court deter-
mines, after individual consideration, that life without the possibility of
parole is inappropriate.302 Noting that Miller did not expressly address
life with the possibility of parole, the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to read Miller so broadly as to render the mandatory imposition of life
with the possibility of parole unconstitutional.303
In making this determination, however, the court did not impose or
suggest a constitutional limit on the mandatory term of years a juvenile
offender may be required to serve before parole eligibility in a life with-
out parole sentence.304 In the absence of guidance, state courts may im-
pose a sentence that teeters, arguably, on the side of the functional equiv-
alent of life without parole.30s
299. Whiteside, 426 S.W.3d at 921 (holding that "this discretionary sentencing range is ac-
ceptable under Miller, as long as on remand the jury is given the opportunity to take into account the
offender's 'age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of his crime').
300. Tate, 352 P.3d at 965 (holding that "if the trial court determines LWOP is not warranted
after considering the defendant's 'youth and attendant characteristics,' the proper sentence is
LWPP"); see also State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 271 (Mo. 2013) ("In that event, the trial court
must set aside the jury's verdict finding Nathan guilty of first-degree murder and enter a finding that
Nathan is guilty of second-degree murder. Nathan then should be sentenced for second-degree
murder within the statutorily authorized range of punishments for that crime."); Lewis v. State, 448
S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 52 (2015) (holding that a mandatory life
sentence for with the possibility of parole after forty years did not violate Miller).
301. See Straley, supra note 1, at 994 & n. 180 (explaining how, in response to Miller, Washing-
ton's legislation, "requir[es] court[s] to consider Miller factors when setting minimum term for
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds").
302. Tate, 352 P.3d at 970.
303. Id.; see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 40, 334 P.3d 132, 145 (Wyo. 2014)
(recognizing "there is merit in the proposition that a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile is contra-
ry to the rationale underlying the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy, we will not find a phantom constitu-
tional restriction that the United States Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to recognize").
304. Tate, 352 P.3d at 970.
305. But see Springer v. Dooley, No. 3:15-CV-03008-RAL, 2015 WL 6550876, at *5 (D.S.D.
Oct. 28, 2015) (holding a 26 1-year sentence with the possibility of parole after thirty-three years was
not a de facto life without parole sentence and did not violate Miller).
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This imposition of a life sentence with a mandatory term-of-years
before parole eligibility,306appears to be a comfortable place for post-
Miller sentencing schemes:30 7
Miller [only] stands for the proposition that a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole may not be mandatorily im-
posed upon a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the crime
without individual consideration of the mitigating circumstances.
That did not occur in [a] case. . . . [where] the defendant received a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole, albeit with considera-
tion coming after fifty-one years.308
As such, states split Miller many different and unpredictable ways in
determining the constitutional limits on mandatory life with parole sen-
tences or mandatory term-of-year sentences.
C. Non-Mandatory Out: Unbridled Discretion Fails Miller and Amounts
to De Facto Life Sentences Without Parole
Some courts and legislatures have employed semantics to contain
Miller, extracting the word "mandatory" to impose sentencing schemes
that are the functional equivalent to mandatory life without parole.309
This allows courts to comply310 with Miller in a literal sense, while un-
dermining the Miller rationale. First, by simply "[s]evering the mandato-
ry nature of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile to provide for
the ameliorative possibility of parole because of characteristics attendant
to youth,"311 courts have nonetheless kept their sentencing statutes in
place, by simply infusing discretion into the sentencing process or pre-
scribing enumerated factors courts may use to guide the sentencing, yet
allowing unfettered discretion that often amounts to the same sentences.
306. See Banks v. People, No. 12SC1022, 2013 WL 3168752, at *1 (Colo. June 24, 2013).
307. See, e.g., Ellmaker v. State, No. 108,728, 2014 WL 3843076, at *10 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug.
1, 2014) ("Considering the explicit way in which the United States Supreme Court has distinguished
life without parole sentences and the death penalty and set them apart from all other sentences, we
decline Ellmaker's invitation to extend this category to include a hard 50 sentence when imposed on
juveniles. Thus, we reject Ellmaker's assertion that a hard 50 sentence on a juvenile offender is the
functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole."); see also Ouk v. State, 847 N.W.2d 698,
701-02 (Minn. 2014) ("[T]he mandatory sentencing scheme at issue in Ouk's case does not violate
the rule announced in Miller because it does not require the imposition of the harshest term of im-
prisonment: life imprisonment without he possibility of release."); People v. Aponte, 981 N.Y.S.2d
902, 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) ("Although both Miller and Graham held it was unconstitutional to
impose life without parole on a person under the age of eighteen, the defendant received no such
sentence. In fact, he is parole eligible. No doubt he is unhappy over the prospect that the aggregate
mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment may preclude him from ever being paroled, he never-
theless remains eligible for it.").
308. Perry v. State, No. W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1377579, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Apr. 7, 2014), appeal denied, Sept. 18, 2014.
309. But see Scavone, supra note 197, at 3477 (noting that the post-Miller "bill was aimed at
comprehensive sentencing reform that takes virtual LWOP into account").
310. Amelung, supra note 290, at 34-35.
311. Exparte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1281 (Ala. 2013).
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This is noticeable in Ex parte Henderson,3 12 where the Alabama Su-
preme Court allowed juveniles to be charged for capital offenses under a
statutory scheme calling for either death or life without parole.3 13 The
court upheld the statutory scheme by replacing its mandatory nature with
a consideration of certain enumerated factors to put juveniles on "actual
notice that, if convicted, they face a sentence of life without the possibil-
ity of parole as a 'ceiling."' 3 14 The court goes on to say that "juveniles
[then] have [additional] notice of the 'floor' as well, because Miller re-
quires that a juvenile convicted of capital murder is entitled to have his
life sentence reviewed for the possibility of parole."
The California Supreme Court followed suit by validating its own
statute that allowed a "juvenile convicted of special circumstance mur-
der" to receive "life without parole or [twenty-five] years to life." 1 6 The
California Supreme Court overruled the lower courts' interpretation of
the statute, which originally "creat[ed] a presumption in favor of life
without parole," holding that it satisfied Miller's ban on mandatory life
without parole.3 17 Here, the court made its statute Miller-compliant by
shifting semantics, insisting that it be "understood to not impose a pre-
sumption in favor of life without parole."318 This, while technically com-
plying with Miller, does not provide any meaningful consideration of
youthfulness per the Miller Court's rationale.
In a similar effort to avoid Miller's broad rationale, many state leg-
islatures have simply added an option that allows a non-mandatory range
of equally harsh sentences to be imposed on juveniles without instituting
Miller's particularized individual consideration test.3 19 Here, courts and
legislatures have taken advantage of the "uncertainty of what [was]
meant by 'individualized sentencing,"' in Miller, though Miller's ra-
tionale alone provides guidance.3 20 For example, Pennsylvania, one of
the first states to respond to Miller with legislation, infused its statutory
scheme with allowable ranges, of course still including life without pa-
role as an option.3 21 As such, a juvenile may still receive a sentence of
life without parole, but the judge or jury may choose an alternative sen-
312. Id
313. Id
314. Id at 1281, 1284.
315. Id at 1281.
316. People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 145 So. 3d 545, 548 (La. App. 2014) (appearing satisfied by
Louisiana's post-Miller laws, which state that "a hearing shall be conducted prior to sentencing to
determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility," though this
sentence scheme simply allows the prosecution and defense to present mitigating and aggravating
factors to support requested sentences; there is no requirement that he judge consider the enumerat-
ed factors in Miller).
320. See Lemer, supra note 195, at 27.
321. Amelung, supra note 290, at 33.
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tence of either thirty-five years to life for juveniles at least fifteen years
old, or a twenty-five years to life for juveniles under age fifteen.322 There
is, however, no requirement that youthfulness mitigate on behalf of the
juvenile during the discretionary sentencing, which reeks of the possibil-
ity of discretionary abuses.
Applying this approach, courts avoid triggering the narrow Miller
holding by asserting, "Miller is distinguishable because [a juvenile's]
sentence of life without parole [is] discretionary, not mandatory."323 Yet
this approach fails to provide meaningful limits on sentencing discretion,
as it lacks mandatory consideration of the mitigating factors of youth set
out in Miller. Because judges have broad discretion when imposing a
sentence and such decisions only are reviewed de novo for abuse of dis-
cretion324 it cannot be guaranteed that Miller's underlying principles-
lessened culpability of juveniles requiring consideration of the mitigating
circumstances of a juvenile offender-will be advanced.325 As noted in
State v. Riley, where the Connecticut Supreme Court held the trial court
did not consider the mitigating factors in Miller:
[T]he dictates set forth in Miller may be violated even when
the sentencing authority has discretion to impose a lesser sen-
tence than life without parole if it fails to give due weight to
evidence that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before
determining that such a severe punishment is appropriate.326
Where courts do consider mitigating factors, in imposing either life
without parole or other functional equivalents, they are not required to
contemplate any particular combination of mitigating circumstances
enumerated by Miller, or afford such circumstances any specific
weight.32 7 As a result, courts may find that any individual consideration
of a juvenile satisfies Miller's mandate."328 Here, a juvenile may receive
322. Id.
323. State v. Lane, No. 2013-G-3144, 2014 WL 1900459 at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12,
2014).
324. Commonwealth v. Batts, 125 A.3d 33, 43, 50 (Penn. 2015) (refusing to "impose a height-
ened burden of proof, and a corresponding more stringent appellate review, in juvenile life without
parole cases").
325. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 508-10 (discussing how Miller, "with its mandate of indi-
vidualized consideration at sentencing, reopens the door to all of the malignity of subjective deci-
sion-making and its fruits"); see also Fuller, supra note 38, at 402 (discussing how even when re-
quiring consideration of mitigating circumstances, "state courts did not elaborate as to what must be
included in this consideration").
326. State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (2015) (overruling appellate court's affirmation of an
effective one hundred year sentence, where the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to
not consider the Miller factors).
327. But see State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-57 (Iowa 2015) (starting from a presumption
that the imposition of life without parole should be uncommon and mandating the consideration of
specific factors rooted in Miller's rationale before imposing a sentence of life without parole).
328. Jones v. State, 769 S.E.2d 901, 905 (Ga. 2015) (affirming, on alternative grounds, the trial
court's imposition of "two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus [eighty-five] years," because
"the trial court explicitly considered Appellant's relatively young age"); see also State v. Williams,
862 N.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Minn. 2015) (affirming the district court's discretionary imposition of
604 [Vol. 92:3
2015] STATE V. BROWN AND JUVENILE SENTENCING 605
a sentence that is functionally equivalent to a sentence of life without the
possibility of release, without any assurance that their sentence embodies
the mitigating purpose of Miller.329
D. Aggregated Sentences
Although not an issue in Brown, courts have also dismantled Mil-
ler's rationale by allowing mandatory sentences to accumulate and effec-
tively amount to life without parole.330 While at least two state supreme
courts have ruled an aggregate sentence that constitutes a de facto life
sentence violates the Constitution under Miller, 33  other courts have
found such aggregate sentences fall outside the scope of Miller.3 3 2 These
courts have declared that egregious term-of-years sentences do not quali-
fy for Miller protection, despite the relatively same effect of mandatory
sentences when applied in the aggregate. While this scenario is not
offensive to the literal Miller holding, it is certainly offensive to the
broader rationale that should "trigger the protections afforded under Mil-
ler-namely, an individualized sentence hearing to determine the issue
of parole eligibility" when imposing a "lengthy term-of-years sen-
tence."334 At least one state supreme court, Iowa, has concluded, albeit
under Iowa's constitution, "all mandatory minimum sentences of impris-
onment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional."335 In any case, the
consecutive sentences, after the district court considered the aggravating circumstances of the juve-
niles' crimes in addition to the mitigation circumstances).
329. See Molly F. Martinson, Comment, Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina
Gets Juvenile Resentencing Right While Other States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179, 2198
(2013).
330. E.g., State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 702 (Minn. 2015) (affirming imposition of an
"aggregate sentence of at least 74 years in prison").
331. Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 144 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that the process of individu-
alized consideration in Miller "must be applied to the entire sentencing package, when the sentence
is life without parole, or when aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without
parole"); see also Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 654 (Ind. 2014) ("[W]e exercised our constitutional
authority and revised the 150-year sentence received by sixteen-year-old Martez Brown for two
counts of murder and one count of robbery.").
332. See, e.g., Nostro, supra note 293, at 176 ("In the immediate aftermath of the Miller deci-
sion, the Sixth Circuit held that an eighty-nine-year sentence created from multiple convictions was
not the same as a life sentence for purposes of requiring consideration of a juvenile offender's age
and mitigating factors of youth. In reaching its decision, the Circuit prioritized the Miller Court's
focus on single-conviction sentencing practices to conclude that the Court did not intend for the
punishment to apply to all forms of LWOP sentences." (footnote omitted)); see also Walle v. State,
99 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that sentences imposed by two different
courts creating a ninety-two-year aggregate sentence was not the functional equivalent of a life
sentence without the possibility of release); State v. Zuber, 442 N.J. Super. 611, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2015) (rejecting the argument that an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years without parole
eligibility was the functional equivalent of life without parole).
333. People v. Reyes, 2015 Ill. App. 2d 120471, T 25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding juvenile
offender's ninety-seven-year aggregate sentence did not offend Miller); Scavone, supra note 197, at
3463; see also People v. Lucero, I ICA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *24 (Colo. App. 2013) (citing
Miller and Graham in finding aggregate sentence of eighty-four years did not violate the Constitu-
tion), cert. granted, 13SC624, 2014 WL 7331018 (Colo. Dec. 22, 2014).
334. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 70-71 (Iowa 2013).
335. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014).
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next question always becomes "how [the] court should proceed in cor-
recting [a defendant's] sentence[?]"3 3 6 Without guidance, courts are free
to work within vague perimeters.
E. Other Ways: Felony Murder
The last common approach that undermines the Miller rationale is
the quiet operation of unfortunate doctrines such as felony murder. As an
initial matter, there is little reason for this doctrine in the context of juve-
nile sentencing.337 While those in favor of the felony-murder doctrine
claim it deters the commission of the underlying crime, it is hard to justi-
fy as applied to juveniles, who are less able to foresee the consequences
of their actions.33 8 Miller recognized lower juvenile culpability based on
factors that include "'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,' leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-
taking." 339 This rational creates the possibility that the Court may later
prohibit sentencing juveniles to life without parole based on felony mur-
der principles of transferred intent.340
Miller recognizes that "defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or
foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most
serious forms of punishment than are murderers."341 The State v. Brown
ruling offends this rationale in its imposition of a hard twenty life sen-
tence for thirteen-year-old Brown's felony murder conviction. The Miller
Court recognized that "the criminal responsibility of juveniles who did
not murder was doubly diminished,"342 and "the rationale underlying
felony murder is [therefore] utterly incompatible with our modem under-
standing of juveniles" especially when imposing such harsh sentences.3 43
This Comment does not take immediate issue with the concept of
felony murder, though, by principle of transferred intent, it stands on
shaky ground.344 However, it must be argued that sentencing juveniles on
the basis of felony murder convictions is contrary to the Miller rationale,
where the application of this doctrine to youth reveals the most offensive
ignorance of the critical differences between juvenile and adult ability to
assess the spectrum of consequences associated with their actions.345
336. Whiteside v. State, 426 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2013).
337. Erin H. Flynn, Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and
Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1071 (2008).
338. Id
339. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005)).
340. Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 130.
341. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 43, 50 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
342. Feld, supra note 1, at 125-26.
343. Shitama, supra note 209, at 845.
344. See id at 842-48.
345. See id at 846.
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In Brown, the court took no issue with the application of the felony
murder charge to thirteen-year-old Keaira Brown. The court simply not-
ed that "[a]t the time of Brown's crimes, first-degree murder was defined
as the killing of a human being committed, '(b) in the commission of,
attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony' . . . ."
and that "[a]ggravated robbery is an 'inherently dangerous felony."'
346
While simplistic definition may be appropriate as applied to an adult
criminal who is less impulsive and better able to understand the conse-
quences of his or her actions, it is wholly inappropriate when considering
both the goals of felony murder doctrine and the reduced culpability of
juveniles.
The goals of the felony murder doctrine are deterrence and retribu-
tion.347 Where "unforeseen acts . . . cannot logically be deterred," and
"culpability should be based on an individual defendant's criminal in-
tent ... and not simply on harm caused in the commission of a crime,"
the justifications for the doctrine are unsubstantiated.348 Consequently,
the doctrine is even less warranted as applied to juveniles. It assumes,
wrongfully so, that juvenile felons, who are less culpable because they
inherently possess a "proclivity for risk, and inability to assess conse-
quences,"349 can "reasonably anticipate any resulting injury and should
therefore be held liable when such injury in fact occurs."350
Miller stands for the proposition "that a juvenile is much less likely
than an adult to recognize that his participation in a robbery or other fel-
ony could potentially result in death or injury," and is therefore "less
likely to be deterred by the specter of even the most severe punish-
ment."35 ' Keaira Brown's felony murder conviction is therefore unwar-
ranted based on this rationale. Here, while it is clear that "[t]he serious
theoretical shortcomings of felony murder liability apply with exponen-
tially greater force to juveniles,"352 it must be noted, "almost every state
prosecutes both children and adults for felony murder,"353 contrary to
Miller's rationale.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IGNORING MILLER
Extending the Miller rationale to forbid mandatory sentencing in all
juvenile cases, or at least in cases that implicate the most severe sentenc-
ing schemes, would create a splash in the modem adult criminal system,
even as it could be extended to warrant the resurrection of a more "re-
346. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 792 (Kan. 2014) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401,
21-3436(4) (repealed 2010)).
347. Shitama, supra note 209, at 843.
348. Id. at 844.
349. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
350. Shitama, supra note 209, at 843.
351. Id. at 845-46.
352. Id. at 845.
353. Id. at 844.
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storative justice" scheme for juveniles.354 Perhaps this is why state courts
have taken to containing the Miller decision in the numerous ways previ-
ously discussed. The inherent effects of each decision to contain Miller
are clear; however, it is necessary to take a step back to see the cumula-
tive and detrimental effect of these decisions; "the practical result is at
odds with the Supreme Court's clear trajectory toward [affording juve-
niles] greater [constitutional] protection and greater leniency . . . in the
criminal context."355 Operating together, every juvenile waiver, and eve-
ry declination to extend Miller form the context in which the constitu-
tional line between juveniles and adults slowly evaporates.
The first incremental step is transfer mechanisms. Of course, juve-
nile transfer decisions, at first glance, do not appear to implicate Miller,
because the Miller holding addresses a mandatory sentence. However,
mandatory and discretionary transfers operate in such a way that they
precede imposition of the harshest adult sentences on youth; "a decision
to send a juvenile to adult court is a decision to end his childhood."356
Transfers effectuate a juvenile's transition, in the eyes of the law, from
child to adult, and carry with them the "profound consequences" of doing
"adult time," among other catastrophic effects.357
Tantamount to sentencing, juvenile transfer undercuts Miller's con-
templation of juveniles as different, where a youth may be transferred
without ever "hav[ing] the opportunity to tell the juvenile court judge
about his background, his mental health, or any other fact that might
make him worthy of an opportunity to take advantage of what the juve-
nile court may have to offer." 358 Here, it is necessary to apply Miller's
broader rationale to transfer proceedings to properly defend the legal
notion that juveniles are different than adults.359
The second incremental step in the dilution of Miller's rationale of-
ten involves juvenile sentencing decisions, which are often nuanced and
chip away at Miller in piecemeal fashion, making it difficult to identify
any single sentencing scheme as the culprit. Despite Miller's broader
rationale with regard to reduced juvenile culpability, a literal interpreta-
tion of Miller's narrow holding is not irrational per se.360 Such decisions
are sound from a purely legal standpoint: a non-mandatory life without
354. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 35 (stating, in response to Miller, "[t]he appropriate
response for these-and all-states is to incorporate restorative justice sentences into the juvenile
sentencing structure").
355. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 1252.
356. Id. at 30.
357. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
358. Id. at 54.
359. See id. (arguing for the application of Miller to transfer decisions because "[w]hile the
Eighth Amendment itself might not apply directly to transfer proceedings, Graham and Miller indi-
cate that juveniles are different and deserve a heightened due process akin to the kind of process that
death penalty litigants have been given through the Eighth Amendment" (footnote omitted)).
360. See Nostro, supra note 293, at 181.
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parole sentence without proper individualized consideration, "an eighty-
nine-year prison sentence without parole," and a mandatory consecutive
fixed-term sentence that is functionally equivalent to life without parole
are all beyond the literal Miller holding.36 ' It is only when recognizing
Miller's broader notion-that a juvenile's youthfulness warrants individ-
ualized consideration of that youth's mitigating circumstances-does
"the reckless danger of a strict interpretation of Miller" reveal itself.362
Simply put, "[a] sentencing scheme that fails to consider a juvenile
offender's potential for rehabilitation is at odds with the Supreme Court's
stance on juvenile culpability." 363 And while Miller may or may not have
ushered in the revitalization of restorative juvenile justice 3  by infusing
our current process of juvenile sentencing with the individualization re-
quirement, "the narrow application of Miller's holding could . .. result in
sentences that run afoul of the concerns over proportionality that are cen-
tral to . . . Miller." 365 In the incremental dilution of Miller, our constitu-
tional concept of juvenile is growing, where post-Miller courts make
sentencing decisions in a legal vacuum, rather than considering the
broader constitutional meaning and effect of Miller.366 The ultimate ef-
fect is a dissipated line between juveniles and adults, where juveniles are
transferred to adult court and sentenced as adults based on their crime
without the court ever needing to assess their juvenile status.3 67 The re-
sult? Juveniles are adults in the eyes of the law.
These effects and their attendant results are demonstrated by exam-
ple. State v. Brown illustrates the unbridled discretion of judges in trans-
ferring a thirteen-year-old offender to adult court despite the presumption
of juvenile jurisdiction. Per typical state transfer mechanisms, juvenile
jurisdiction over Brown was waived "with little or no consideration of
[her] child status or the mitigating circumstances surrounding [her] of-
fense."368 The broad discretion of the district court at the transfer stage,
as it impeded a meaningful consideration of Brown's youth, is incremen-
tal step number one. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed this unguid-
ed and potentially hostile consideration, reviewing the decision with the
deferential lens of abuse of discretion, while ignoring the presumption
triggered by Brown's youthfulness.369
361. Id. at 180-83.
362. Id. at 181-82.
363. Id. at 189-90.
364. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 31-32 ("[T]he appropriate response for all states, includ-
ing those not affected by the Miller decision, is to incorporate a restorative justice sentencing regime
into the juvenile justice system.").
365. Nostro, supra note 293, at 180.
366. See id at 179-86.
367. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53-54.
368. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 830-31.
369. See supra Part I.
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After being transferred to adult court, Brown was then charged with
particular crimes (felony murder and robbery), which were attached to a
specific, mandatory sentence-a sentence the court held did not violate
Miller's narrow holding, although it foreclosed any meaningful consider-
ation of Brown's youthfulness.370 Thus, immediately upon conviction "in
adult court, [the] mandatory sentencing laws proscribe[d] age and other
mitigating factors from weighing in the determination of [her] punish-
ment .. . ."3 Here, Brown's juvenile status not only failed to mitigate on
her behalf during transfer, it could not even mitigate on her behalf after
transfer.
In light of these incremental steps, it is now imperative to take a
step back. The Court's reasoning, in the Roper, Graham, and Miller tril-
ogy is this: juvenile offenders are less culpable and therefore less deserv-
ing of harsh adult sentences.372 Allowing juveniles to undergo little or no
consideration of mitigating factors at the transfer level, only then to be
subjected to mandatory prison terms at the sentencing level is an ex-
pressway to "adulthood" the Supreme Court has slowly tried to fore-
close.373 Miller sought to distance juveniles from adult treatment by
mandating individualized consideration when imposing the harshest sen-
tences. The means chosen, however-the individual consideration man-
date-indicate a return to the principles of the juvenile court.374 That is,
the Court recognizes that focusing on the crime in making a juvenile do
adult time does not comport with the known scientific fact that juveniles
are less able to asses risk, comprehend consequence, and resist peer pres-
sure.375 As such, where it is apparent that "[a]n offender's age has no
bearing on the amount of harm caused-children and adults can inflict
the same injuries. But youths' inability fully to appreciate wrongfulness
or to control their behavior may reduce culpability and lessen blamewor-
thiness for the harms they cause."376
CONCLUSION
Juveniles are not adults, and "[t]he Court has explicitly stated that
the Constitution may apply differently to juveniles and adults."377 How-
ever, there is tension where juvenile sentencing jurisprudence recognizes
the "culpability differences between juveniles and adults, and [courts]
370. Shitama, supra note 209, at 796.
371. Id. at 831.
372. See Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 142 (Wyo. 2014); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
373. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458-60, 2463-69.
374. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 24 ("While the Court's decision does not provide guid-
ance for its implementation, it does provide a significant impetus to change the manner in which the
legal system holds juvenile criminals accountable for their crimes.").
375. See Feld, supra note 1, at 113-21.
376. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
377. Wood, supra note 2, at 1467.
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nonetheless subject[] them to the same sentencing schemes."3 78 Thomp-
son, Roper, Graham, and Miller established a tradition of treating juve-
niles differently using a common thread of reduced juvenile culpability
to limit the availability of particular sentences as applied juvenile offend-
ers.379 Miller, in particular, introduced individualized consideration of an
offender's youthful status before imposing life without parole, and the
broader Miller rationale supports an individualization requirement in all
-380juvenile sentencing proceedings.
Post-Miller courts have effectively undermined this broad rationale,
using loosely considered transfer decisions to trigger a myriad of manda-
tory sentences and severely limiting the application of Miller.38 1 The
Miller Court sought to re-establish the line between young offenders and
adult criminals, barring sentencing schemes that impose mandatory life-
382without-parole on juveniles. In announcing this new rule, the Court
contemplated, or perhaps hoped, that "appropriate occasions for sentenc-
ing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty w[ould] be uncommon."383
However, this has not been the case; where juveniles are continuously
subjected to a sentence of functional equivalence, life without parole, as
subsequent courts incrementally dismantle Miller's rationale. This phe-
nomenon is demonstrated effectively by the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Brown.
In Brown, an ill-considered transfer mechanism equalized a thir-
teen-year-old offender and adult criminals, undermining Miller's con-
templation of juveniles as less culpable than adults and warranting indi-
vidualized consideration. With extreme deference afforded to lower
courts, reviewing courts rarely reverse transfer decisions, even when an
abuse is present. This is in spite of a constitutional principle of lessened
culpability, the harsh consequences of transfer, and even a statutory pre-
sumption against ransfer. As Brown also demonstrates, the most pro-
nounced manner in which courts foreclose the operation f Miller's ra-
tionale in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence is denying extension of Mil-
ler through a myriad of creative sentencing schemes that avoid Miller's
holding but offend its rationale. Courts may refuse to apply Miller in
contexts other than mandatory life without parole. In minimally comply-
ing with Miller's narrow holding, courts and legislatures employ a varie-
ty of creative strategies: some legislatures sever the mandatory nature of
378. Flynn, supra note 342, at 1073.
379. See Kelli E. Antes, Case Comment, Taking a Life Without Taking a Life: State v. Ninham
Violates the Eighth Amendment by Sentencing a Fourteen-Year-Old Juvenile to Life in Prison With-
out Parole, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 215, 241 (2013).
380. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53.
381. See e.g., Nostro, supra note 293, at 176.
382. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) ("We therefore hold that the Eighth
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life without parole while giving little effect to individual consideration
before imposing life without parole; other courts impose the next most
severe punishment that may operate as the equivalent to life without pa-
role.
Our current legal system therefore suffers a bifurcation of juvenile
sentencing philosophies. Juvenile jurisprudence insists youthfulness is a
unique status with regard to legal treatment of criminal offenders, as seen
most potently in Miller. A variety of states, however, dismantle Miller's
broad rationale; they "lump" juveniles into the adult criminal system and
charge accordingly, with little or no regard for youthfulness as a categor-
ically distinct status.3 84 As a result of diminishing Miller's reach, the
constitutional line between juveniles and adults originating in the juve-
nile courts and advanced by Miller is inevitably and incrementally
erased.
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